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Abstract  This paper tests the central predictions of the theoretical tax competition literature 
for capital tax rates for a panel of European Union countries, notably a race to the bottom in 
capital tax rates. One measure of capital mobility is found to exhibit a downward pressure on 
capital taxes while another measure shows a positive correlation. Empirical tests imply that the 
latter positive relationship may be caused by neglecting to control for the agglomeration forces 
linked with capital mobility. If this is indeed the case, the results lend strong empirical support to 
the hypothesis of a downward pressure on capital tax rates in absolute terms and relative to labor 
taxes, but add to this that agglomeration forces mitigate, and might even outweigh the race to the 
bottom effect of increasing capital mobility. 
 
Keywords: Tax competition; Capital taxation, European financial integration, Capital mobility 
 
JEL Classification: H2; F2; F36 
 
 
                                                    
a Comments and suggestions from Charles Wyplosz and Jan Lemmen are gratefully acknowledged. Also thanks to 
Dennis Quinn and David Carey for giving access to their data on financial market liberalization and implicit tax rates 
respectively. Errors and omissions remain the responsibility of the author. Address for correspondence: Signe 
Krogstrup, C/O ESCWA, PO. Box. 11 8575, Riad el-Solh Square, Beirut, Lebanon. Tel: (+961) 3 880 894, Fax: 





Capital has become increasingly mobile within the European Union in the last few decades. 
Capital controls are lifted, and the Single Market allows businesses approved in one member 
country to set up shop in other member countries without acquiring a new license. In addition to 
intra-EU foreign direct investment, the Single Market significantly facilitates cross border 
portfolio investment. The introduction of the single currency has, moreover, eliminated inter-EU 
currency risk and facilitated cross-country comparisons of prices of financial products. All these 
changes have reduced barriers to flows of both financial and real capital in the European Union. 
It is not uncommon to hear that increasing capital mobility creates a milieu in which governments 
will engage in a competitive race to the bottom in everything from environmental standards and 
product quality to social security. Belonging in this ￿race to the bottom￿ line of reasoning is the 
argument that increasing mobility of capital will result in a downward pressure on taxation, 
particularly on capital, and an increase in the relative tax burden on less mobile factors such as 
labor. These concerns have been particularly voiced in a European Union context, where internal 
liberalization of capital flows is, perhaps, farther reaching than in any other regionally integrating 
constellation of countries. But what is often disregarded in the debate on the consequences of 
liberalization ￿ be it regarding European integration, or globalization in general - is that theories 
of bottom-racing behaviors are just that: theories among other theories, based on a subjective 
choice of modeling setup and a subjective choice of simplifying assumption. Indeed, it is possible 
to arrive at different conclusions with small changes in underlying assumptions or modeling 
framework. 
 
The theoretical literature on capital tax competition allows for cases where capital mobility 
causes an increase or a divergence in capital taxation rather than a race to the bottom, as soon as 
asymmetries, political economy considerations, or simply strategic interaction due to size of the 
competing countries are allowed for. In particular, allowing for increasing returns and 
agglomeration rent to arise when capital mobility increases may reverse tax competition forces 
entirely. 
 
Whether one theory should be chosen over other theories modeling the same phenomenon should 
dependent on whether the theory is supported by the facts, or whether it has predictive power, 
rather than whether the theory suits a certain political agenda. So the question is, what has 
happened to capital taxation in European Union countries during the years in which capital 
mobility has increased? There has not been firm evidence so far that tax competition has lead to a 
downward pressure on capital taxation in EU countries. Some studies even find a popular 
measure of capital mobility, Quinn￿s 14-point index of financial liberalization, to be positively 
correlated with capital taxation, opposite to the race to the bottom theory. But the evidence is at 
best uncertain, and the empirical literature is fragmented and thin. No empirical studies of EU 
countries alone have been carried out previously, and moreover, predictions allowing for 
asymmetries and agglomeration forces have not been tested empirically, even for the more 
heterogenous panels of OECD countries, which have previously been studied. 
 
This paradox ￿ lack of consistent empirical support for a theory that has gained political influence 
and a certain recognition ￿ is addressed in this paper by testing five hypotheses derived from the 
theoretical literature for a panel of European Union countries. The main challenge in conducting 




that capital mobility is not directly observable; it is a phenomenon, influenced by numerous other 
variables, for which only its effects on other measurable variables may be observable. Before an 
empirical analysis of the link between capital mobility and taxation may begin, extensive effort 
therefore needs to be directed into identifying appropriate and credible methods for assessing the 
degree of capital mobility through its effects on other variables. Two such measures, which are 
appropriate for a panel regression analysis, are identified in this paper: Quinn￿s 14-point index 
mentioned above and covered interest parity differentials. Measuring capital mobility is not the 
only measurement problem, however. Measuring the tax burden on capital and labor is not 
straightforward due to the degree of detail and idiosyncrasy of national tax laws and how 
statistics on taxes are constructed. The paper discusses different options and selects two tax 
burden measures suitable for panel regression analysis, namely corporate tax revenues in percent 
of GDP, and ex post implicit tax rates. 
 
The empirical analysis shows that the choice of measure of capital mobility matters for whether 
tax competition is found to take place in the European Union. The results are that capital tax 
competition does seem to have put a downward pressure on capital tax rates and shifted the tax 
burden from capital toward labor in EU member states during the 1980s and 1990s, but that 
agglomeration economies seem to have counteracted this downward pressure. The finding that 
agglomeration economies may reverse tax competition pressures on capital tax rates is a novel 
result in the empirical literature, and may provide an explanation for the counter-intuitive results 
of a list of previous attempts at identifying tax competition pressures empirically. More research 
efforts need to be directed into identifying the effects of agglomeration forces on capital taxation, 
given the strong implications the existence of such forces would have for the correct formulation 





A review of the theoretical literature on capital tax competition
1 shows that under restrictive 
assumptions, increasing capital mobility within the European Union is predicted to result in a 
race to the bottom in capital tax rates. But when the restrictive assumptions are relaxed, the 
predicted consequences of increasing capital mobility for capital taxation in the European Union 
become more nuanced. As an example, different types of cross-country asymmetries, such as size 
of the country as well as degree of clustering of economic activity, may play a non-negligible role 
in determining that country￿s choice of tax rate in equilibrium. In particular, clustering of 
economic activity may reverse the effect of capital mobility on the tax rate and result in a ￿race to 
the top￿ in capital taxation. The review of the theoretical literature hence shows that a race to the 
bottom is not the only logical consequence of increasing capital mobility, and that this prediction 
depends on a set of restrictive assumptions underlying the basic tax competition model. In lack of 
a more detailed and precise theoretical framework for analysis, the question of how capital 
mobility affects capital taxation in the European Union should therefore be an empirical one.  
 
Turning to the empirical evidence, it has not been established, beyond anecdotal evidence, that 
capital tax competition and race to the bottom in capital tax rates is taking place in the European 
Union. This is in spite of the fact that financial liberalization has been taking place for many 
years, and in spite of the fact that capital mobility has reached high levels. A number of studies of 
OECD countries look for empirical evidence of tax competition pressures, but do not find 
consistent evidence of such pressures, and some even find evidence supporting the hypothesis of 
a race to the top. In spite of the intense political debate on this topic in the European Union, no 
studies use panels consisting of only European Union countries. Moreover, existing studies only 
test for the central prediction that capital mobility results in a downward pressure on relative and 
absolute capital taxation. Thus, no studies test allow for the wider range of hypotheses, which can 
be derived the theoretical literature. There are no empirical tests of the asymmetry hypothesis, of 
the consequences of concentration of economic activity for tax competition, etc. 
 
The aim of this paper is to bridge this gap in the literature, by searching for empirical evidence of 
the presence of capital tax competition pressures in a panel of European Union countries. More 
specifically, five testable hypotheses derived from the theoretical literature on tax competition 
identified in Krogstrup (2002) are tested empirically for a panel of EU countries. 
 
The structure of the paper is the following. Section   2 presents five testable hypotheses derived 
from the theoretical literature on tax competition. Section   3 looks at the previous empirical 
literature on capital taxation and capital mobility. Section   4 derives a methodology for testing for 
the presence of tax competition pressures in European Union countries. A basic specification for 
testing the five hypotheses for a panel of EU countries is set up. Section   5 deals with the 
problems of measuring capital mobility and tax burdens on capital. Three measures of capital 
mobility are chosen due to data availability and relative preciseness, namely Quinn’s 14 point 
index of financial liberalization (also referred to as Quinn14), FDI stocks in percent of GDP and 
absolute covered interest parity differentials (referred to as the CIP). Only two measures of the 
absolute tax burden on capital are picked out for the same reasons, namely corporate tax revenues 
relative to GDP and the implicit capital tax rate. When the relative tax burden on capital is 
                                                    




analyzed, the corporate tax revenues relative total tax revenues, and the implicit capital tax rate 
relative to the corresponding implicit tax rate on labor are used. The results of the empirical 
analysis are presented in Section   6. The final section concludes. 
 
2.  Predictions of the theoretical literature on tax competition 
Krogstrup (2002) presents the theoretical literature on capital tax competition in a unifying 
framework, and derives 5 testable hypotheses concerning the effect of increasing capital mobility 
on capital taxation from this literature. The central predictions concerning capital taxation in the 
European Union derived from the tax competition literature are: 
 
H1: The higher the capital mobility, the lower the provision of public goods. 
 
H2: The higher the capital mobility, the lower the tax revenues from and tax burden on capital 
taxed at the source. 
 
These predictions are, however, based on a set of rather restrictive assumptions about the 
economies in which tax competition takes place. The assumptions include the simplification that 
the regions between which tax competition takes place are identical; that capital is taxed only at 
source; that there are no other sources of tax revenues than capital taxation; that the government 
choosing the tax rate does this with the only aim of maximizing welfare for its citizens; that 
changes in capital mobility does not bring about political change; and that there are region-level 
decreasing returns to capital (and hence no agglomeration forces in play). Relaxing these 
restrictions allows for the predictions of the tax competition literature to change. 
 
When residence taxation of capital is enforceable, capital income taxation at the source is 
predicted to be zero under perfect capital mobility. However, since there is no real measure of 
whether residence taxation of capital is enforceable, and since residence taxation is usually 
argued to not be enforceable in the European Union, this hypothesis is not empirically testable 
and will not be considered any further here. When assuming that also labor income can be taxed, 
increasing capital mobility will result in a partial or full switch of the tax burden from capital to 
labor income. The hypothesis concerning capital taxation in the European Union derived from 
models allowing taxation of imperfectly mobile labor is therefore: 
 
H3: The higher the degree of capital mobility, the higher the tax revenues from and tax burden on 
labor income relative to that of capital income. 
 
Relaxing the assumption that countries are small gives each of the competing countries market 
power to affect the world after-tax rate of return to capital when setting the capital tax rate. This 
does not change the conclusion that the tax rate is too low and that public goods are under-
provided in equilibrium, however, but it does mitigate the under-provision result so that the 
equilibrium Pareto-dominates the small-country equilibrium. Hence, the first two hypothesis of 
the tax competition literature are not affected by the assumption concerning the size of the 
countries.  




When the assumption of symmetry of the competing countries is relaxed, and differences in the 
size of capital endowments or population are allowed for, the elasticity of capital to the tax rate is 
perceived to be higher by smaller countries. The larger country will therefore set a higher tax rate 
relative to the smaller country, although still too low to be efficient, and the smaller country will 
be better off than the larger one. In extreme cases, the small country may be even better off than 
under coordination. Asymmetric models have no clear answer to how asymmetry affects public 
good provision compared to the symmetric case. The fourth hypothesis concerning capital 
taxation in the European Union derived from the tax competition literature is therefore: 
 
H4: The larger the country, the smaller the downward pressure of capital mobility on the tax rate 
 
When assuming that the government is motivated partly, or fully, by self-interest, the 
inefficiency result may be reversed, so that the coordination result is inefficient and tax 
competition enhances efficiency. But the predictions for the tax rate on capital remain the same 
as for the basic model where government is assumed benevolent. 
 
Allowing for democratic elections, it is shown that increasing capital mobility moves the political 
equilibrium toward the left side of the political spectrum, thus counterbalancing the downward 
pressure on tax rates. However, the move to the left does not outweigh the tax competition 
pressure and the net effect of increasing capital mobility on capital income taxes is still found to 
be negative. Hence, allowing for democratic elections mitigates the sup-optimality result but does 
not eliminate it and the qualitative predictions are the same as those of the basic tax competition 
literature. 
 
When agglomeration rents are allowed for, the conclusions change since attracting industry to 
one location creates agglomeration rents which can then be taxed without capital fleeing, in spite 
of capital being perfectly free to move. Agglomeration rents make capital a quasi-fixed factor, 
and thus create a margin between the return to capital of the agglomeration and other locations, 
within which a positive tax rate can be set without reaching the limit where capital flees to 
another location. 
 
H5: The more concentrated production is in the country, the smaller the downward pressure of 
capital mobility on the tax rate 
 
The next Section evaluated the previous empirical literature on whether capital tax competition is 
taking place in the European Union. 
 
3 The  Literature 
A necessary condition for tax competition to be taking place in the European Union is that the 
behavior of European investors is such that investment decisions are sensitive to national capital 
taxation. In turn, there are two sides to tax sensitivity of capital flows; investors must be both 
willing and able to react to tax differentials between countries, i.e. capital must be technically 
mobile across borders and taxes have to be considered significant determinants in investment 
decisions. The degree of capital mobility alone is therefore not enough to determine whether this 




of establishing the sensitivity of different types of capital flows to the tax rate, with the larger part 
investigating the sensitively of foreign direct investment to tax rates, and a smaller part looking 
into the effect of tax rates on cross border flows of bank deposits. There does not seem to be any 
studies on the empirical effect of taxes on the placement of portfolio investment. Another strain 
of the empirical literature is comprised of a few studies aiming to establish whether tax setting 
behavior of governments is affected by the tax rates of other countries by estimating reaction 
functions. Finally, a part of the empirical literature searches directly for correlations between 
measures of capital mobility and tax burdens on capital using regression techniques, in order to 
test the tax competition hypothesis. These three parts of the empirical literature on capital 
mobility and tax rates are discussed in turn.  
 
  Empirical Studies of the Sensitivity of Capital Flows to Tax Rates 
The larger part of studies of the tax sensitivity of FDI looks at inward and outward US FDI
2,3. 
Many early studies fail to link taxes and FDI flows
4. More recently, time series regressions as 
well as cross sectional studies of FDI into and out of the US have found a positive sensitivity of 
FDI to variations in host country tax rates in particular, while the impact of variations in tax rates 
in the country of origin have been less clear. An example of a time series analysis of aggregate 
inward FDI is Slemrod (1990), who finds a significantly negative tax elasticity of US inward 
FDI. By distinguishing between country of origin he finds significant differences between the tax 
elasticity of FDI from different countries of origin. Grubert and Mutti (1991), Hines and Rice 
(1994), and more recently Altshuler, Grubert and Newlon (1998) carry out cross sectional 
analyses of outward US FDI and host country tax rates. All three studies find that tax rates 
significantly influence FDI flows. The latter study, moreover, carry out the same cross sectional 
analysis for two different years and finds that the elasticity of US country specific outward FDI to 
the host country tax rate has been increasing from 1984 to 1992. This finding supports the 
hypothesis that capital mobility has been increasing in that period. Hines (1999) provides a 
comprehensive list of studies of FDI based on US data.  
 
Moving beyond studies of US data, only very few contributions to the literature exist and no 
studies of tax effects on FDI purely based on data for EU countries seem to be carried out. 
Devereux and Freeman (1995) investigate the tax sensitivity of the allocation of FDI between 
seven OECD countries (Germany, Italy, France, the Netherlands, Great Britain, Japan, the US) in 
the late 1980s and find that the allocation is significantly determined by the tax wedge while a tax 
effect on the choice between domestic and foreign investment is not found, supporting the results 
of the studies based solely on US data. BŁnassy-QuØrØ, FontagnØ and LahrØche-RØvil (2000) 
study the effect of nominal corporate tax rates on inward FDI in 11 OECD countries and find the 
tax effect to be significant. Finally, Gropp and Kostial (2000) go a step further. Not only do they 
seek to establish the effect of taxes on FDI, they in turn estimate the effect of FDI flows on 
                                                    
2 One reason for this is the superior quality of US data on FDI. 
3 Most studies of tax effects on FDI location use the micro-approach to measuring the tax burden on capital, in that 
the pre- and after tax cost of capital is calculated using national tax codes. 
4 This is pointed out by Morisset and Pirnia (2000), and may, among other reasons, be due to omitted variables bias 
since the tax burden on capital often will be correlated with the public provision of other advantages to business, 
such as education and infrastructure. See Hines (1999) for a more thorough discussion of reasons why early studies 
have not found significant relationships and reasons why taxes might not be very important in location decisions of 




corporate tax revenues in order to simulate the effect of corporate income tax harmonization in 
Europe on FDI flows and corporate tax revenues. They find that taxes matter not only for FDI 
inflows, but also for FDI outflows in contrast to the previous literature. Moreover, they find a 
positive relationship between FDI inflows and corporate tax revenues, all else equal
5. 
 
The central conclusion of the empirical literature on the tax sensitivity of foreign direct 
investment is that tax rates affect the choice of location of FDI. However, the empirical support 
for the proposition that tax policy of the home country of an investor should affect this investor￿s 
choice between foreign and domestic location of investment is rather week. This implies that only 
tax rates directly affecting foreign investors can be effectively used to attract investment while 
tax rates only affecting domestic investors do not seem to affect incentives to keep investment at 
home. These findings offer a potential explanation for the popularity of tax holiday schemes 
targeted to foreign investors in general, and may explain Ireland￿s recent successes in attracting 
FDI. 
 
A small number of studies look into the effect of interest taxation on the location of bank and 
non-bank deposits. Grilli (1992) investigates the influence of capital controls, withholding taxes 
and bank secrecy laws on the international flows of deposits for 10 major OECD countries from 
1972 to 1987. He finds that inter-bank deposits only respond to withholding taxes on dividend 
income in the country of placement  (i.e. not to the tax which is applied directly to deposits, but 
the taxation of alternative investment) while non-bank deposits respond to the withholding tax on 
deposits in the country of placement. A more recent study by Huizinga and NicodØme (2001), 
also based on data for OECD countries, finds that international deposits are sensitive to domestic 
interest tax rates, but not to withholding taxes in the country of placement abroad, contrary to the 
estimated tax sensitivity of foreign direct investment. In sum, there is some, although vague, 
evidence of tax sensitivity of the choice of where to place international bank deposits. 
 
Although none of the studies reviewed above look exclusively at EU countries, it seems safe to 
conclude that tax policy of EU countries can be expected to affect the placement of deposits and 
the location of FDI across EU countries in addition to the size of corporate tax revenues in EU 
countries. Tax policy is therefore a potential tool for attracting capital to the country. However, 
the above studies do not reveal anything about whether European policy makers have actually 
used this tool, in turn triggering tax competition. They merely imply that the incentives to do so 
are there. 
 
  Empirical Estimations of International Tax Reaction Functions 
Two studies, which both are being carried out as this is being written, look at whether national 
tax setting behavior is influenced by the tax rates of other countries, and hence whether countries 
engage in tax competition, by estimating tax reaction functions between countries. These studies 
are inspired by the recent empirical literature on policy reaction functions, which until now has 
been limited to estimating tax reaction functions for legal jurisdictions within a country, and not 
                                                    
5 In effect, Kropp and Kostial (2000) find a positive relationship between FDI and the profit tax base from which the 
effect of FDI on tax revenues can be derived. They thus only consider the tax base effect and does not take into 





6. Devereux et al. (2001) estimate the reaction functions of 10 OECD countries￿ 
tax rates on capital, using three different measures of capital tax rates, namely the statutory tax 
rate, a measure of the average effective tax rate and the cost of capital
7. They find, preliminarily, 
that governments do, indeed, react positively to changes in the average international capital tax 
rate when the statutory and average effective tax rate on capital is concerned, but they are not 
found to react to international changes in the cost of capital. Besley et al. (2001) estimate reaction 
functions for tax revenues in percent of GDP for five overall tax categories, by modeling tax 
ratios as a function of the tax rates of the other countries of the sample, in addition to several 
control variables. For a sample of OECD countries, they preliminarily find that tax ratios do react 
to changes in the average of international tax rates, and more so for taxes on tax bases which are 
considered mobile (e.g capital). 
  
The two studies hence imply that governments do indeed react to other governments￿ changes in 
tax rates. But it is still not possible to conclude that a spiral of strategic interactions in tax rates 
has led to a significant downward pressure on tax burdens on capital in EU countries.  
 
  Studies of Correlation of Capital Mobility and the Capital Tax Burden 
A relatively recent empirical literature takes its starting point in the political science literature on 
the effects of globalization on political institutions, and notably, on fiscal variables. Among other 
endeavors, this literature takes the next step to look for ex post evidence of whether incentives to 
engage in tax competition have been reacted on, and in turn, whether the tax burden on capital 
has decreased in response to increases in capital mobility. These studies look for correlations 
between measures of the degree of capital mobility and ex post measures of the tax burden on 
mobile capital, using panel regression techniques. They therefore face the obvious difficulty of 
looking for correlations between two variables of which neither can be directly observed. 
Moreover, empirically implementable ways of measuring tax burdens and the degree of capital 
mobility are not abundant. The methods that do exist at best have high degrees of white noise, at 
worst may also be considerably biased or imprecise. Section   5 gives a more into depth discussion 
of how to measure the degree of capital mobility and the tax burden on capital. 
 
Several studies, including the one conducted later in this Chapter, use the correlation approach to 
test for the presence of tax competition in spite of the above-mentioned shortcomings, in lack of a 
better alternative to testing for tax competition pressures on tax rates. The results of these studies 
are summarized in Table   0-1. None of the previous studies find support for the predictions of the 
theoretical tax competition literature. The effect of capital mobility on capital taxation as well as 
on expenditures is consistently found to be either insignificant or positive, leaving no support to 
the central hypothesis of the theoretical tax competition literature. 
 
Garrett (1995) tests for the effect of increasing capital mobility on government spending, deficits 
and capital taxation. In a panel regression for OECD countries, he finds the effect of capital 
mobility on capital taxation to be insignificant while the effect on government spending and the 
government deficit to be significantly negative. Hence, rather than placing a downward pressure 
                                                    
6 See Brueckner (2001) for an overview of this literature. 




on tax rates which in turn would result in lower public spending, capital mobility is found to exert 
a direct downward pressure on spending.  
 
Quinn (1997) regresses several measures of the corporate tax burden on an index of financial 
liberalization, Quinn’s 14-point index (also referred to as Quinn14 in the following), and finds 
that contrary to the tax competition hypotheses, the corporate tax burden is significantly 
positively related to financial liberalization. Similarly, Rodrik (1997) includes a dummy for 
capital account restrictions in his regression of capital taxation, which shows the same as the rest 
of the literature: less capital account restrictions are found to be associated with higher capital tax 
rates. 
 
In Swank (1998a), the author estimates the effect of two measures of capital mobility, namely 
covered interest parity differentials and the Quinn14 measure of capital mobility
8, on measures of 
effective tax rates on labor, capital and consumption in a panel regression for OECD countries. 
He finds no evidence to support the tax competition hypotheses that tax rates on capital have 
declined in response to higher capital mobility, nor does he find that the relative tax burden has 
shifted toward the less mobile labor income and consumption. He does, however, find the 
Quinn14 measure of capital mobility to be significantly positively associated with capital 
taxation, contrary to the race to the bottom theory.  
 
Hallerberg and Basinger (1998) investigate the effect of capital liberalization on changes in 
statutory tax rates across OECD countries, and find that capital liberalization is insignificant in 
explaining such changes.  
 
Finally, the most recent study in this line of research, Garrett and Mitchell (2001), confirms 
previous results. Garrett and Mitchell regress effective tax rates on capital alone and relative to 
consumption and labor effective tax rates on three different measures of capital mobility: FDI 
flows in percent of GDP, covered interest parity differentials and Quinn14
8. They find that capital 
taxes are not systematically lower when financial integration is higher, and moreover, do not find 
a systematic relationship between capital mobility and the tax burden of capital relative to those 
of labor and consumption. They do find a significantly positive relationship between FDI flows 
and the effective rate of capital taxation, and government spending to be negatively related to the 
Quinn14 measure of capital mobility. 
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Quinn (1997)  -Corporate Tax 
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Tax Revenues 
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Revenues % GDP 
-Corporate Tax 
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Tax Revenues 
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/b OECD  Countries, 
1974-1989 
Effect of capital 
mobility on corporate 
tax in % of personal 
tax: 0.443 
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0.003 
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1967 (1961 for 
spending) ￿ 1992 
-Effect of Quinn14 
on Spending: -0.095 
-Effect of FDI on 
Implicit Capital Tax: 
0.419 
/a: Covered Interest Parity Differentials 
/b: Quinn￿s 14 point index of financial liberalization 
 
In brief, studies looking for correlations between measures of capital mobility and measures of 
the tax burden on capital and spending have not found any evidence in support of the central 
hypotheses derived from the theoretical tax competition literature. In contrast, several studies find 
significantly positive correlations between capital mobility on the one hand, and capital tax 
burdens on the other hand. Some support for a downward pressure on government spending from 
increasing capital mobility has been found, however. 
  What the Literature Does Not Account For 
The empirical literature on the sensitivity of cross border capital flows to tax rates finds that 
capital is indeed sensitive to national capital taxation in OECD countries. This means that there is 
scope for using national tax policy to attract capital to the country, or in other words, there is a 
potential for tax competition to take place. Moreover, estimation of tax reaction functions shows 
that national taxes do respond to taxes of neighboring countries, implying that strategic 
interaction in tax rates is prone to take place. There should hence be a negative relationship 
between capital mobility and capital taxation. However, studies looking for direct correlations 
between measures of capital mobility and the tax burden on capital do not find this to be the case 
in OECD countries. On the contrary, there seems to be slight evidence that capital taxation has 




the partial prediction of the tax competition literature that capital mobility puts a downward 
pressure on government spending. 
 
There are many potential explanations of these results. One could be that tax competition does 
not take place or has not yet started. Or alternatively, that the predictions of the economic 
geography literature that higher capital mobility leads to higher degree of clustering of economic 
activity, with higher economic rents to tax lump sum. Or yet, that political economy forces are in 
play, limiting the scope of or reversing capital tax competition. But the lack of significant support 
for tax competition hypotheses might also stem from problems with the design of the previous 
empirical literature. Seven such potential problems are identified below in order to provide 
remedies in the empirical investigation of the next section.  
 
1.  Imprecise or poor measures of capital mobility. The measures of capital mobility used 
in the literature may not adequately be capturing the degree of capital mobility. The next section 
gives a more detailed discussion of and justification for the choice of measures of capital 
mobility, but has not been able to identify a new and better approach. 
 
2.  The tax base effect. As will be discussed in the next section concerning measures of tax 
burdens, some of the significantly positive parameter estimates might be capturing a tax base 
effect rather than a tax burden effect. If the measure of capital taxation, such as corporate tax 
revenues in percent of GDP, does not take into account changes in the capital income tax base on 
which the capital tax is applied, and the capital income tax base is positively correlated with 
financial liberalization, a positive relationship between the tax burden measure and the capital 
mobility measure should be expected. This point is not valid as explanation for the significantly 
positive parameter estimates found by Swank (1998a) and Garrett and Mitchell (2001), as these 
studies have used measures of corporate tax burdens, which do take into account the tax base. 
The issue of taking into account the tax base is discussed in more detail in the next Section.  
 
3.  Overall trend in tax revenues. The overall tax level, as well as the degree of capital 
mobility, has increased for reasons unrelated to tax competition during the investigated period. If 
capital taxation has been adjusted along with other tax categories to the post-war growth of the 
public sector in Europe, and the overall tax level is not included as control variable in the 
regressions, this might lead to an omitted variables bias
9. The overall trend in total tax revenues is 
controlled for in the robustness checks of the empirical analysis of the next section.  
 
4.  Omission of agglomeration and asymmetric size and income effects. None of the 
previous studies have controlled for the effect of asymmetries in size and agglomeration 
economies on the effect of capital mobility on the tax rate. If, for example, agglomeration 
economies are important determinants of the pressure of capital mobility on tax rates, not taking 
this variable into account will lead to omitted variables bias, since increasing capital mobility 
leads to increasing agglomeration, according to a simple model presented in Krogstrup (2002). 
Similar arguments can be made for the omission of asymmetries in economic size. Moreover, the 
positive sign may simply be a story of countries, when they get richer, liberalize and start taxing 
                                                    
9 However, this potential omitted variables bias would not be able to explain the finding of positive correlations 
between capital mobility and the corporate tax relative to the personal income tax found in the study of Quinn 




more (Wagner￿s law). If this is the reason for the positive correlations, then the omission of 
income per capita might lead to an omitted variables bias.  
 
5.  Unit roots and spurious correlations. Another issue which is not addressed in the above 
mentioned studies is that of unit roots. Several of the variables used in the regressions may have 
unit roots, implying that there is a potential risk of spurious correlations, although the risk of 
spurious regressions due to nonstationary data is lower in panel data than in traditional time series 
analysis
10. A discussion of which variables might be non-stationary, helped by formal tests for 
unit roots, is given in the following section, and variables which are likely to have a unit root are 
first differenced. 
 
6.  Heterogeneity of the panels. The panels studied in the previous literature may have been 
too heterogeneous, by using various OECD countries and including observations from the 
structurally very different 1970s. The sample of countries or the time period may have to be 
narrowed down to attain more homogeneity. This is done in the analysis later in this paper by 
limiting the panel to EU countries and excluding the 1970s from the sample. Moreover, 
sensitivity analyses to the included countries in the panel are carried out, and prove to be 
important in showing the lack of robustness of some results. 
 
7.  Endogeneity. There is a potential source of endogeneity in these types of regressions. The 
dependent variables are fiscal variables and hence may have an effect on economic activity, and 
in turn, on some of the explanatory variables. This is clearly the case for growth and inflation, but 
fiscal policy may also influence capital flows and interest rates, and hence potentially the 
measures of capital mobility which are often based on these variables. The parameter estimates of 
the capital mobility indices may therefore be biased. Lagging the explanatory variables by one 
year or using instrumental variables may substantially reduce this potential risk of endogeneity 
bias of the parameter estimates
11. Since instruments for capital mobility, which are not prone to 
exactly the same source of endogeneity, are hard to find, the option of lagging the explanatory 
variables is used in the empirical analysis of this study. 
 
Finally, it is very interesting to observe that while capital tax competition and the potential 
adverse effects on taxation in European Union countries is an argument which has been used 
frequently in the public debate over the future of fiscal policy in the European Union, no purely 
European empirical panel regression studies of these issues have been carried out. Moreover, the 
empirical studies of OECD country panels are limited to testing the central prediction of the tax 
competition literature that increasing capital mobility should result in lower taxes on capital. 
There are no studies conducting comprehensive tests of other important predictions derived from 
the theoretical literature on tax competition. The next part of this paper aims to fill these gaps, by 
providing a panel regression analysis of five tax competition hypotheses, for a panel of EU 
countries, and taking into account the seven points outlined above concerning the lack of results 
of the previous literature. Point five to seven are taken into account in the empirical methodology 
                                                    
10 See Baltagi (2002)￿s chapter on non-stationary panel data. 
11 Of the above mentioned studies, only Swank (1998a,b) clearly states that the explanatory variables are lagged in 
the regression of corporate implicit tax rates, while it is less obvious whether Quinn (1997) uses lagged or 




and procedures used, while the first four points are looked at in the robustness analysis of the 
regression results or included directly in the hypotheses to be tested.  
4. Methodology 
 The  Basic  Specification 
Empirical tests of the five tax competition hypotheses require a basic specification of a regression 
equation for different types of tax rates and tax ratios as well as for public spending. Theoretical 
tax competition models do not provide a fully-fledged structural framework from which an 
estimating equation can be derived. Instead, inspiration is found in the empirical literature on 
fiscal effects of globalization reviewed above. The following basic specification is proposed:  
 


















































Where the dependent variable, BUDGET, is primary expenditures in percent of GDP when 
hypothesis one is tested. For hypotheses two, four and five, the dependent variable is a measure 
of the tax burden on capital. Hypothesis three is tested using a ratio of the tax burden on capital in 
percent of either the total tax burden or the tax burden on labor. Different ways of measuring the 
tax burdens are discussed in the section on data below. Table 1 summarizes the different 
hypothesis specific dependent variables used. 
 
In line with the bulk of the empirical literature carrying out regressions of tax and/or expenditure 
ratios, inflation (INFL) and real growth (GR) are included to capture the cyclicality of the budget 
and inflation induced changes in tax revenues due to changes in the nominal tax brackets in 
which income is taxed. Moreover, current inflation also proxies for money growth and hence also 
controls for monetary financing of the budget. Current growth is expected to be negatively related 
to expenditures and tax revenues to GDP
12. The expected sign of inflation in the expenditure 
regression is positive while that of the tax regressions does not lend itself to a priori 
identification. Demographic changes are controlled for by including the participation rate 
(PART)
13, defined as the labor force divided by the population between 15 and 65 years old. The 
greater the value of PART, the more participation and the less burden on social security. Hence, 
                                                    
12 It can also be argued that according to Wagner￿s Law, growth should lead to preferences for larger government 
and hence to higher taxes and expenditures in percent of GDP. But this is a longer-term argument as opposed to the 
above, and will not be taken into account here. 
13 The participation rate is included in a similar regression in Garreth and Mitchell (2001) and found statistically 
significant. Alternatively, or additionally, the ratio of over-65 year olds to the total population (OLD), which is found 




the participation rate is expected to be negatively related to tax as well as spending measures. 
Openness of the country to trade is controlled for by including the imports and exports to GDP 
ratio (OPEN)
14. According to the arguments and empirical findings of Cameron (1997) and 
Rodrik (1999), among others, overall taxes and spending are expected to be positively related to 
the degree of openness of the country, while there is no a priori expectation for capital taxes or 
tax ratios per se
15. In order to control for the political influence on capital tax burdens, which 
Person and Tabellini (1992) argue may be correlated with the degree of capital mobility (see 
Krogstrup (2002)), a dummy for partisanship is included, taking the value one when the 
government in power is defined as being to the left (LEFT)
16. A leftwing government is a priori 
expected to prefer higher overall taxes, higher taxes on capital and higher spending all else equal, 
thus implying that the a priori sign of LEFT is positive in regressions of expenditures and taxes, 
as well as the tax mix regressions. The unemployment ratio (UN) is included to capture the direct 
influence of unemployment on the personal income and social security payments, which is 
expected to affect taxes negatively and government spending positively. The effect of 
unemployment on capital taxes relative to other taxes is a priori ambiguous. MAAS is a dummy 
for the ￿Maastricht years￿ and takes the value 1 from 1993 and onward. Since the Maastricht 
Treaty imposes an upper limit to the budget deficit, the expected sign is negative in the 




Ω is a vector of variables which, as BUDGET, are specific to the particular hypothesis tested. For 
hypotheses one, two and three concerning the effects of increased capital mobility on fiscal 
variables, the vector will simply consist of a measure of capital mobility. When hypothesis four 
on the implications of differences in country size for the outcome of the tax competition game is 
tested, the Ω vector in addition includes capital mobility interacted with a measure of country 
size. When hypothesis five on the implications of the degree of agglomeration for capital income 
taxation is tested, a measure of capital alone and in interaction with a measure of degree of 
agglomeration are added to the Ω vector. Different ways of measuring the degree of capital 
mobility, country size and degree of agglomeration are discussed in the section on data below. 
The hypothesis specific dependent and explanatory variables are summarized in Table   0-2. 
                                                    
14 Garrett and Mitchell (2001) and Swank (2001) find it statistically in their regression of the effective capital tax rate 
while Hallerberg and Basinger do not. 
15 Cameron (19972) argues that positive relationship between government size and openness is due to higher rates 
industrial concentration in open countries, and hence higher union power and, in turn, higher demand for government 
services and spending. Rodrik (1999) alternatively argues that the positive relationship is due a greater need for 
social insurance in open countries, which are characterized by higher economic risks and fluctuations of an open 
country. 
16 The construction of the index LEFT is explained in Data Appendix. Using LEFT is in line with Garrett and 
Mitchell (2001), who control for number of portfolios held by left wing parties as well by christian democratic 
parties, and Swank (1998), who controls for number of portfolios held by leftist parties. Swank also controls for the 
election cycle by including a dummy taking the value one in years of parliamentary elections. Since there is no 
reason to expect measures of capital mobility to be correlated with such a dummy, excluding it does not lead to an 
omitted variables bias and an election year dummy is left out. It is, however, controlled for in the robustness check. 
17 Dummies for whether the exemption or the credit system is used as double taxation relief system is not included in 
the analysis in spite of this variable being identified as having an effect on the location decision of investment. The 
reason for this exclusion is that this dummy would provide no time variation and would hence be correlated with the 
country fixed effects of the regression. Moreover, carrying out the regressions for either exemption countries or 
credit countries separate does not change the results substantially (results of these regressions are not shown but can 





Finally, υ i is a country specific error term (can be fixed or random) while ε it is the country and 
time specific error term. See appendix for the precise definition of the variables used in the 
regressions. 
 
As pointed out in the review of the empirical literature, endogeneity is a potential problem in the 
above specification. To avoid endogeneity bias, all explanatory variables are included with a lag. 
There is also a risk of finding spurious correlations since unit roots in the levels of several of the 
explanatory variables as well as the dependent variables are likely
18. The country specific data 
series are tested for stationarity and results of the tests (see unit root test results and descriptive 
statistics in Data Appendix) support this suspicion, although it should be kept in mind that the 
short time series make the strength of the test very low
19. All variables except growth and 
inflation are likely to exhibit unit roots. Hence, growth and inflation are included in levels while 
the rest of the variables are first differenced in the basic specification. Including growth and 
inflation in first differences is carried out as a robustness check and commented below
20. 
5.  Data Sources and Measures 
Most data is taken from OECD revenue statistics and OECD Economic Outlook. There are a few 
exceptions, some of them mentioned below and the rest are listed in Data Appendix. Two types 
of data, namely tax burdens on capital and labor income and the degree of capital mobility, are 
not directly observable and therefore have to be measured. How to measure these two variables is 
discussed in some detail in the next two subsections. Moreover, the degree of agglomeration and 
size of a country needed for testing hypotheses four and five are also not straightforward and 
hence given some consideration below.  
  Measures of Tax Burdens 
Not all capital is taxed at the source, and hence, not all capital taxes are necessarily squeezed by 
increasing capital mobility. It is important to first identify the types of capital taxation which are 
prone to tax competition, in order to target measures of the tax burden on capital toward these 
types of tax competition. An brief overview of capital taxation in the European Union is given 
below, after which, possible measures of the tax burden on capital are discussed.  
 
Are all capital taxes prone to tax competition? 
Many different types of capital income taxation coexist in European Union countries. Whether 
the tax is levied on capital income of individuals or companies, whether the income is interest, 
dividend or retained earnings, among other factors determine whether the tax is levied at the 
source of the income or at the residence of the investor, whether capital income taxed abroad is 
                                                    
18 Even if some variables exhibit unit roots, the risk of finding spurious correlations is lower in a panel, due to the 
added information in the cross section dimension. See Baltagi (2002). 
19 The risk of type II errors is very high and the test cannot confirm but only be used to support suspicion of unit 
roots in the data. If the unit root tests were the only criteria on which the choice of whether to carry out the 
regressions in levels or first differences were based, more attention should be diverted to carrying out panel unit root 
tests. However, since this is not the case, it is not done here. 
20 The equation could alternatively be estimated entirely in levels including the lagged explanatory variable, but 
when the lagged dependent variable is included in a fixed effects panel regression, this introduces a bias due to the 
correlation of the lagged dependent with the fixed effects. Due to this potential bias and the potential spurious 




tax-exempt at home or whether a credit is provided, as so on. Theoretical models of tax 
competition typically assume a specific type of capital taxation and look at how tax competition 
may or may not arise as a response to increased capital mobility. It is usually found that only 
source based capital income taxation is prone to tax competition, while enforceable residence 
based capital income taxes are not. Residence taxation of capital income is, however, often 
argued not to be enforceable due to lack of international information exchange on capital income. 
While the lack of information exchange does not lead to tax competition, it does imply that 
residence taxation is prone to tax avoidance
21. It is therefore important to identify the types of 
capital taxation resembling the source type tax and those resembling residence type taxes. With 
this in mind, corporation tax and personal capital income tax, are discussed in turn.  
 
Corporate income from international investments can originate from both direct and portfolio 
investments
22. Income from these two types of investment is generally treated identically for tax 
purposes, but a distinction is made between interest income and dividend income. Corporate 
foreign equity investment income taxation broadly follows the source principle for taxation, in 
that the country hosting the investment levies taxes on the profits of activities in the host country. 
In order to avoid double taxation of foreign source income in the home country, corporations are 
either exempted from taxes on foreign source income or benefit from a limited tax credit in their 
country of residence. The tax credit is usually limited to a maximum of the residence country tax 
obligation, which the gross of source tax foreign income generates. Whether the exemption 
system or the credit system is used makes a difference to a firm’s decisions of where to locate 
investment. To see this, note that if foreign source income is tax exempt, then the foreign tax rate 
is the final tax rate applied to income from the foreign investment. If a limited tax credit of the 
size of the foreign tax is applied to foreign source income, and the foreign tax rate is lower than 
the residence tax rate, the domestic tax will be the final tax rate applied to the foreign source 
income, and the tax will resemble a residence tax even though some of the tax revenue is paid at 
source. Conversely, if the foreign tax is higher than the domestic tax under the limited credit 
system, the taxation of foreign source income resembles a source tax. Residence taxes are only 
paid when profits (i.e. dividends) are repatriated under the credit system, which hence also may 
resemble the source tax system until repatriation takes place. Since about half of the European 
Union countries apply the exemption system to foreign source income of corporations
23, and 
since the credit countries only apply the limited credit system, the taxation of corporate foreign 
source investment income in the European Union may be viewed as closely resembling sourced 
based taxation. Corporate taxation is hence prone to source based tax competition as laid out by 
the theoretical tax competition literature reviewed below. 
 
The taxation of foreign source interest income differs from that of equity investment income in 
that all OECD countries have adopted a limited tax credit system
24. Hence, taxation of foreign 
interest income should resemble that of a residence based system. Haufler (2001), however, 
argues that since the country of residence have difficulties in monitoring the foreign source 
                                                    
21 See Soerensen (2001) for a discussion of the implications for capital taxation in the European Union. 
22 See European Commission (2001) for a definition of FDI vs. portfolio investment. 
23 Exemption countries in the European Union are Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany and The 
Netherlands. 
24 Moreover, interest paid are most often deductible from the profit tax base, which means that parent companies 
have an incentive to use debt financing of subsidiaries compared to equity finance. This tax-induced non-neutrality 




capital income of their residents, residents easily evade domestic taxes on foreign source income, 
and since most countries levy zero withholding tax on interest income, taxes on foreign source 
interest income may to a large extent be entirely evaded in the European Union
25. 
 
Other than affecting firms￿ investment decisions and therefore the location of assets, taxation 
may also trigger international relocation of profits by multinational corporations. There are 
several ways that multinational corporations can shift their tax burden to lower-tax countries 
without changing the location of their assets: relocation of cost (relocating production cost in 
high-tax countries), transfer pricing techniques, and thin capitalization (debt financing instead of 
equity financing of a subsidiary due to interest expenses that the subsidiary pays to the company 
being deductible from taxable income). 
 
Turning to taxation of capital income of individuals, the domestic tax rate applied to individuals￿ 
capital income is either the personal income tax rate, or - which is more and more often the case - 
a flat rate on individuals’ global capital income
26. A limited tax credit system also applies to the 
taxation of individuals’ interest income from abroad which is taxed at source, and the taxation of 
individuals’ interest income hence resembles closely the residence system, which is not prone to 
tax competition pressures, but is likely to be prone to tax avoidance: since interest income is 




In order to relieve double taxation of net of corporate tax dividend income of individuals, some 
countries have imputation systems in which the shareholder pays the difference between the 
income tax of the dividend and the corporate tax already paid. Some countries exempt dividends 
from income taxation entirely, while other countries have no provisions for avoiding double 
taxation. However, countries with imputation-type systems do not provide credits for foreign 
source dividend income, such that foreign source dividends are always subject to double taxation. 
 
In conclusion, corporate capital income taxation behaves like source taxation and is therefore 
particularly prone to the types of tax competition presented in the theoretical literature review 
below
28. In contrast, taxation of individuals’ capital income follows more closely the residence 
principle and is therefore not as likely as corporate taxation to be under the tax competition 
pressure modeled in the basic tax competition literature. However, tax revenues from individual’s 
capital income may have been declining with the increased capital mobility as well, as it has 
become easier to invest abroad, hence making it less likely that information about the proceeds 
from these investments reach the residence tax authorities. It has thus become easier to avoid 
                                                    
25 This conclusion is inspired by Haufler (2001). Soerensen (2001) makes the same conclusion but does not extend it 
to company interest taxation. 
26 Several countries have recently switched to a dual income tax system, in which labor income is taxed at a 
progressive rate while income from investments (i.e. interest, dividends and capital gains) is taxed at a flat rate which 
is usually lower than that applied to labor income, and sometimes zero. See Joumard (2001). 
27 To counter the presumed widespread tax avoidance on foreign interest income in EU countries, the European 
Commission proposed a combined plan for information exchange and minimum withholding taxes on interest 
income in the EU. EU finance ministers accepted a revised plan in 2000, with an emphasis on information exchange 
among EU member states in the longer term being the solution, and contingent on specific third countries accepting 
participation. See Joumard (2001). 
28 To the extent, of course, that the particular corporate tax base is mobile. Some corporate profits might not be. An 




taxes on individuals’ capital income. Measures of the tax burden on capital for the present 
purposes should thus be targeted as far as possible on corporate income taxation. As the 
discussion below will show, this is not always possible, and broader measures of the tax burden 
on capital will often have to be used. 
 
Constructing a measure of the tax burden 
Four categories of measures of the absolute tax burden on capital and the tax burden on capital 
relative to labor are discussed below: tax revenues in percent of GDP or total taxes, statutory 
capital tax rates, effective tax rates and implicit tax rates. Two criteria are used in choosing which 
measures of tax burdens to use: first, whether data exists/is accessible, and second, whether the 
measure contains ex post evidence of tax competition. Whether the measure reflects the tax 
incentives which corporations or capital would respond to is less important in the present 
contexts, since the response of capital to tax rates is not what is being investigated. Measures of 
marginal tax rates are therefore not discussed. The choices of measures of tax burdens for the 
present study are summarized in Table   0-2. 
 
Tax revenues in percent of GDP 
In the basic tax competition model, tax revenues and the tax rate on capital both decline as a 
consequence of tax competition when capital mobility increases. Capital tax revenues in percent 
of GDP should hence be suitable as the dependent variable in a panel regression testing for the 
presence of tax competition pressures. The main obstacle to measuring capital income tax 
revenues, however, is that taxes derived from capital are not directly reported in aggregate 
internationally comparable statistics. Tax revenues are usually split up in the three overall 
categories of indirect taxes, personal income taxes and corporate (or business) taxes, and capital 
income can fit into either of the two latter categories. Moreover, since personal income taxes also 
include taxes on income from unincorporated business and labor income as well as interest, 
dividend and capital gains from invested savings, there is no straightforward way of separating 
personal income taxes derived from capital income from that derived from other sources of 
income (attempts at doing so are made, however, see below).  
 
One way of avoiding the problem of identifying capital tax revenues is to focus only on corporate 
income tax revenues. This would be justified by the above conclusion that corporate income 
taxation follows the source principle, as opposed to personal capital income. If corporate income 
is the part of capital income which is most mobile internationally, and if tax competition 
pressures are not found for this part of capital income taxation, then it is not likely to be found for 
other types of capital income taxation either
29. Data on corporate tax revenues are easily 
available, and moreover, tax revenues in percent of GDP are predicted by the tax competition 
model to decline in the face of tax competition pressures, implying that tax revenues in percent of 
GDP should reflect the presence of tax competition, all else equal. Corporate tax revenues in 
percent of GDP will therefore be used as one of two dependent variables when testing hypotheses 
2, 4 and 5. Corporate tax revenues in percent of total tax revenues will be used as one of two 
dependent variables when testing hypothesis 3.  
 
                                                    
29 Devereux et al (2002) use this argument in justifying only looking at measures of the corporate tax burden in the 




Figure   0-1: EU average and standard deviation of corporate tax revenues in percent of GDP, 1970-2000. (Source: 




















The EU average and standard deviation of corporate tax revenues in percent of GDP are plotted 
in Figure   0-1. The plot shows that there has been an upward trend in average EU corporate 
income tax revenues since the mid 1970s, contradicting the central predictions of a race to the 
bottom in capital taxation. Clearly, the positive trend in corporate tax revenues partly reflects the 
positive trend in overall tax collections and the size of the public sector which has taken place in 
the post war era, but this cannot be the whole story. The growth of the public sector halted in the 
mid 1990s in EU countries
30, while from the mid 1990s, the positive trend in corporate tax 
revenues became even stronger. Capital tax revenues in percent of total tax revenues are plotted 
in Figure   0-2 and show a similar picture. Corporate tax revenues have been a rather steady 
fraction of total tax revenues, between 5 and 6 percent, until the mid 1990s, after which the 
fraction increased to 8 percent in 2000. 
 
Figure   0-2: EU average and standard deviation of corporate income taxes in percent of total tax revenues, 1970 ￿ 





























The recent increases in corporate tax revenues may stem from increases in the corporate tax base. 
This eventuality draws the attention to two potential problems with the use of corporate tax 
                                                    




revenues in percent of GDP as a measure of the tax burden on capital. First, the statistical 
definition of the corporate tax base may change at a certain point in time. Alternatively, 
incentives to register capital income in a certain category may change, in turn shifting tax 
revenues from the corporate to the personal income category, without changes in the economic 
definition of tax rates or bases taking place. Second, the corporate sector may simply grow or 
decrease as a proportion of the economy over time, leading to changes in corporate tax revenues 
unrelated to tax policies. Growth in the corporate tax base is very likely to account for the 
increase in corporate taxes to GDP and to total tax revenues of the late 1990s. A measure of the 
tax burden is therefore more precise if it takes into account changes in the corporate tax base.  
 
Statutory tax rates 
The statutory tax rate per definition takes into account the tax base. But the statutory tax rate has 
a similar and equally problematic drawback: The definition of the capital tax base to which the 
statutory rate is applied may differ significantly across countries, and does not correspond to the 
economic tax base. Examples of such cross-country differences include differences in the 
provisions for double taxation relief
31, tax holidays and provisions for writing off depreciated 
capital. All of these are important in measuring the tax burden on capital, but would not show up 
in any statutory tax rate. Statutory tax rates on capital are therefore not used as dependent 
variable in any of the empirical tests for tax competition of Section   6. 
 
As alternatives, the empirical public finance literature has come up with several approaches to 
how to measure the average country tax burden on a particular tax base. Following the 
terminology used in Devereux et al. (2001), there are two types of measures of average tax 
burdens: effective tax rates and implicit tax rates. Effective average tax rates are measures of tax 
rates which are based directly on the legal-formal tax framework of the country in question
32. 
Implicit tax rates, on the other hand, are derived from aggregate statistics on tax revenues and 
national accounts. Both approaches are discussed in turn below. 
 
Effective Tax Rates 
A methodology for calculating the marginal effective tax rate on capital has been proposed by 
King and Fullerton (1984), who suggest calculating the cost of capital on a hypothetical 
investment project for a given cost, horizon, country of origin, and other parameters, only letting 
the tax structure differ across the countries that are compared. The marginal effective tax rate is 
measured as the difference between the cost of capital gross of tax payments and net of tax 
payments. An average effective tax rates along the same lines is proposed by Devereux and 
Griffith (1998), who calculate the effective average tax rate as the difference between the net of 
tax and gross of tax cost of capital of the net present value of a hypothetical investment project. 
The advantage of effective tax rate measures is that they are rather precise and directly 
comparable across countries for the given underlying assumptions concerning the hypothetical 
investment project. The drawback is that the effective tax rate tends to vary substantially with 
these underlying assumptions, such that seemingly small changes in the assumptions concerning, 
                                                    
31 Double taxation is a problem when the classical capital tax system is used, following which corporate dividend 
payments are taxed as corporate profits and individuals receiving the dividend payments are taxed on this income as 
well. There as almost as many systems for relieving this source of double taxation as there are countries in the 
European Union. See Joumard (2001) for an overview. 
32 Effective average tax rates often refer to the macro-approach to measuring average tax burdens described above. I 




for example, the type of financing, may change the conclusion about the relative size of capital 
taxation across countries dramatically. The effect of changes in the underlying assumption 
concerning the hypothetical investment project on the derived effective tax rate is clearly pointed 
out and shown empirically for EU countries in Hugounenq et al. (1999). One way to get around 
this problem would be to calculate the effective tax rates for a continuum of different underlying 
investment projects and taking the average as the overall effective tax rate. This is, however, out 
of the scope of the present study. Moreover, since effective tax rates more than reflecting ex post 
potential tax competition pressures, reflect the fiscal incentive structure for the underlying 
hypothetical investment project, and is hence less suited as tax burden measure in an empirical 
investigation of ex post effects of tax competition. Effective tax rates will hence not be used here 
as a measure of the average tax burden on capital. 
 
Implicit Tax Rates 
As opposed to the effective tax rate approach, the methodology used to calculate implicit tax 
rates takes its starting point in available aggregated data on tax revenues and taxable income, and 
is hence in essence an ex post measure of tax burdens. The seminal paper proposing a 
methodology along these lines is that of Mendoza, Razin and Tsar (1994). Mendoza et al. (1994) 
outline a methodology for how to classify different categories of tax revenues and income from 
OECD revenue statistics and national accounts into three tax categories, namely labor income, 
consumption and capital income. Capital income tax revenues are defined as a residual when all 
tax revenues from labor income and consumption have been identified, which makes this 
measure of the tax burden on capital somewhat broad and imprecise. Carey and Tchilinguirian 
(2000) propose refinements to the Mendoza et al. capital and labor income tax burden measures 
and as such are more appropriate, but still suffer from being broad and imprecise
33. The main 
problem with the use of the implicit tax rate on capital as proposed by Carey and Tchilinguirian 
(2000) in empirical studies of tax competition is that it includes capital tax base categories which 
are not viewed as being mobile tax bases, such as property and inheritance taxation. Moreover, it 
includes capital tax bases, which are not formally taxed at the source, such as savings taxation. 
But it does have the advantage of taking into account changes in the tax base, as well as 
providing a relatively large sample for a large number of countries. Carey and Tchilinguirian 
(2000) provide data for almost all the EU countries from 1980 to 1997. The Carey and 
Tchilinguirian (2000) implicit tax rate on capital is chosen as the second dependent variable when 
testing hypotheses 2, 4 and 5. The implicit capital tax rate divided by the implicit labor income 
tax rate is used as dependent variable when testing hypothesis 3. The EU average and standard 
deviation of both are plotted in Figure   0-3 and Figure   0-4, and tell a very different story 
compared to that of corporate tax revenues. The implicit capital tax rate has shown an overall 
negative trend throughout the last two decades, lending support to the tax competition 
predictions. Only in the late 1980s and early 1990s and again in the last part of the 1990s did the 
implicit capital tax increase. Moreover, in line with the prediction of the tax competition models, 
the EU average implicit capital income tax rate has clearly decreased over the last 2 decades 
compared to the implicit tax rate on labor. 
 
                                                    
33 Carey and Tchilinguirian (2000) point out a number of problems with, among other factors, the treatment of social 
security contributions, (one such problem was that they were included twice in the numerator of labor income 
taxation), employers’ pension contributions, the division of self employed income between capital and labor income, 
























Figure   0-4: EU average and standard deviation of implicit capital income tax rates in percent of implicit labor 






















Due to the given problems in using the implicit capital tax rate in studies of tax competition 
pressures, Devereux et al. (2002) propose alternatively to calculate an implicit corporate tax 
rate
34. Corporate profits are considered belonging to the more mobile of capital incomes, and 
moreover, using the implicit corporate income tax is consistent with the fact that corporation tax 
is the only capital income tax which is formally and consistently levied at source in EU countries. 
However, available data on operating surpluses for the corporate sector, which are used as 
measures of the economic tax base in calculating implicit corporate tax rates, are very limited and 
for several countries not available at all
35. Moreover, as pointed out in Devereux et al (2002), the 
                                                    
34 Devereux et al (2001) acknowledge that other capital taxes, which are not included in the corporate income tax, 
may be prone to capital income tax competition pressures. They argue, however, that tax competition is most likely 
to be found in corporate income taxes due to the tax structure of corporate income, and if not found there, is not 
likely to prevail in other forms of capital taxation either. 
35 Data on gross operating surplus of the corporate sector are provided by Eurostat, but only till 1997 after which the 
series are no longer are produced. Moreover, no data on gross operating surpluses are available for Austria, Greece 




operating surplus is net of interest paid and received, while paid interest are not taxed and 
received interests are. Correcting for this flaw is cumbersome and would have to be done on a 
country-by-country basis. For these reasons, the implicit corporate tax rate is not used as 
dependent variable in the regressions. However, for illustrative purposes and in order to use it in 
robustness tests, the corporate implicit tax rate using the gross operating surplus is calculated for 
the 9 of the EU countries for which data is available. A plot of the EU average and standard 
deviation of the implicit corporate tax rate is provided in Figure   0-5
36. No discernable trend is 
present in this average, thus implying that the increase in average EU corporate tax revenues over 
the same time period mostly stems from an increase in the tax base. As for corporate tax revenues 
in percent of GDP and total taxes, an increase in the last part of the 1990s is also present, but less 
pronounced, implying that the increase in corporate tax revenues of the late 1990s is due in part - 
but not fully - to increases in the tax base. 
 
Figure   0-5: EU average and EU standard deviation implicit corporate tax rate, 1970-1996 (Calculated s corporate tax 

































Main points concerning tax burden measures 
The above overview of different measures of the tax burden on capital reveals that depending on 
which data is chosen, descriptive statistics on tax burdens may tell many different stories about 
the effect of capital mobility on tax rates. Corporate tax revenues in percent of GDP and in 
percent of total taxes have increased significantly in recent years, contrary to the predictions of 
the theoretical tax competition literature. The corporate implicit tax rate has remained stable 
during the same time period, implying that the recent relative increases in corporate tax revenues 
are due to increases in the corporate tax base. Moreover, the implicit tax rate on capital has 
mostly decreased over the last two decades, lending support to the central prediction of the tax 
                                                                                                                                                                           
(OECD national accounts definition). Data on net operating surpluses for the corporate sector are provided by OECD 
national accounts and the samples are even smaller than those of the gross operating surplus. Another problem with 
using the net operating surplus is that the way to adjust for consumption of fixed capital is very different across 
countries, making the series from some countries very volatile while the series of other countries are very stable, 
further discrediting the use of this measure for a cross country investigation.  




competition literature. For reasons of data availability, for the sake of comparison and due to their 
attributes as ex post tax burden measures, two of the three above mentioned measures will be 
used as dependent variable in turn, in testing hypotheses 2, 4 and 5: the implicit capital income 
tax rate calculated using the Carey and Tchilinguirian (2000) method and corporate tax revenues 
in percent of GDP. Hypothesis 3 will be tested using corporate tax revenues in percent of total tax 
revenues and the implicit tax rate on capital in percent of the implicit tax rate on labor as 
dependent variables for the same reasons. Hypothesis 1 is tested using primary expenditures in 
percent of GDP as dependent variable. The choices of hypothesis specific dependent variables are 
summarized in Table   0-2. 
  Measures of Capital Mobility 
Just as there is no perfect, but several imperfect, measures of the tax burden on capital, there is no 
straightforward measure of the degree of capital mobility, but there is a battery of suggested 
proxies. Approaches to constructing empirical measures of capital mobility can be split into 4 
different categories: The legal/formal approach; the volume approach; the price approach; and the 
macro approach. Each type of measure, what it has to say about the degree of capital mobility in 
the European Union over the past few decades and whether the measure is appropriate to use in 
the panel regression analysis is discussed in this section. The choices of measures for the 
empirical analysis are summarized in Table   0-2. 
 
The legal/formal approach 
The degree to which capital flows freely across national borders is influenced, if not entirely 
determined by, the legal framework governing financial transactions between residents and non-
residents of a country. National financial regulation can therefore be coded into an index of the 
restrictions to the free movement of capital. The simplest way to create an index of capital 
mobility based on the legal/formal framework is to create a dummy taking the value one if some 
type of restriction of cross border financial transactions is in state in the respective country, and 
zero otherwise. Alesina et al (1994), among other studies
37, construct four dummies on the basis 
of information from the Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions of the IMF, each dummy taking 
the value of one if there are restrictions in one of the four following areas of financial cross 
border transactions: the existence of multiple exchange rates, restrictions on current account 
transactions, restrictions on capital account transactions and requirements of surrender of export 
proceeds. The four dummies can be used separately, or as a weighted average, as measures of 
capital mobility. 
 
Quinn (1997) proposes a more sophisticated measure of capital mobility based on the 
legal/formal framework governing international capital transactions, also based on information on 
financial regulation from the above mentioned IMF publication. Quinn’s 14 point index is 
constructed using a scoring system to translate restrictions on not only outward but also inward 
capital account transactions, outward and inward current account transactions, and finally, the 
existence of agreements limiting the future use of capital controls, into a quantitative measure 
ranging from 0 (financially closed) to 14 (financially open). Quinn proposes using the first 
difference of the 14-point index as a measure of financial liberalization. Figure   0-6 shows the 
                                                    
37 A non-exhaustive list of studies using discrete legal measure of capital mobility is Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995), 




mean and standard deviation of Quinn’s 14-point index for EU14
38. The trend is clear: financial 
liberalization in the EU has increased and the dispersion in the degree of liberalization has 
narrowed - much confirming the usual perception of how capital mobility has evolved in the last 
few decades. The individual country series (not shown) increase during almost the entire period 
for all 14 countries, conforming to the general perception of increased capital mobility in the 
European Union during the last three decades. Quinn’s 14-point index will be used as one of three 
measures of capital mobility in the empirical analysis. 
 
Perhaps the most important drawback of the legal/formal approach to measuring capital mobility 
is its discrete nature, since the sheer presence of restrictions does not necessarily convey any 
information about the magnitude of the actual impact of the restriction on capital flows. For 
example, mechanisms for enforcement of the legal restrictions may prove of key importance to 
the effect of the restrictions. Moreover, non-legal restrictions of cross border capital flows such 
as transaction costs and institutional barriers, may also significantly influence the degree of 
capital mobility, and are not taken into account in the legal approach
39.  
 



























The volume approach 
Another measure of the degree of capital mobility widely used in the literature is the volume of 
gross cross border stocks or flows of either portfolio capital, foreign direct investment flows or 
both, and rests on the assumption that increases in the mobility of capital results in increasing 
flows of cross border investment. 
 
                                                    
38 I am very grateful to Dennis Quinn for kindly providing data on Quinn’s 14 point index for EU countries in 
electronic form. 




Both stocks and flows of cross border investment have been used in the literature as measures of 
capital mobility
40. Which of the two measures is the conceptually more consistent one to use as a 
proxy for capital mobility depends on whether a certain degree of capital mobility corresponds to 
an equilibrium level of gross stock or gross flow of foreign investment. Arguably, if two 
countries with different returns to investment and zero capital mobility between them open up to 
capital flows, capital would flow until the returns to capital were equalized, after which there 
would be no more incentive for capital flows. Hence, a certain stock of foreign investment would 
correspond to a certain degree of capital mobility in equilibrium, which implies that stocks would 
be the more correct measure of the degree of capital mobility. The same conclusion is arrived at 
when using portfolio theory arguments, as Adam et al. (2001) do
41. Adjustment to a new degree 
of capital mobility may, however, be sluggish, in which case it could be argued that flows are 
better short-term indicators of changes in capital mobility. Following Obstfeld and Taylor (2001) 
and Adam et al. (2001), stocks have been preferred to flows for the present treatment of capital 
mobility. New estimates of stocks of FDI and portfolio equity investment positions carried out by 
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001) and data on portfolio debt assets and liabilities from IFS 
International Investment Position data has been used to construct 3 measures of capital mobility: 
the sum of inward and outward FDI stocks; the sum of inward and outward portfolio equity 
investment stocks; and finally the sum of inward and outward portfolio debt investment stocks, 
all three in percent of GDP. The EU average and standard deviations of the three measures are 
plotted in Figure   0-7, Figure   0-8 and Figure   0-9. Only for the first were data available for all EU 
countries
42, and hence, the samples used to calculate the averages are not the same for the three 
measures. For this reason, only the FDI stock in percent of GDP is used as a measure of capital 
mobility in the empirical analysis. 
Figure   0-7: EU average and standard deviation of sum of inward and outward stock of FDI in percent of GDP, 1970 


























                                                    
40 Obstfeld and Taylor (2001) look at cross border stocks of FDI and portfolio investment as an indicator of capital 
mobility, while Garreth and Mitchell (2001) and Swank (1998) use FDI and portfolio capital flows. 
41 Portfolio theory implies that investors diversify optimally and hold a portfolio on the efficient frontier. Hence, 
comparing the actual portfolio with the optimal, or benchmark, portfolio, should give an indication of the degree of 
financial integration. 
42 Data for neither of the portfolio measures were available for Greece and Ireland. Moreover, data on stock of 





Figure   0-8: EU average and standard deviation of sum of inward and outward portfolio equity investment stock, 



























Figure   0-9: EU average and standard deviation of sum of inward and outward portfolio debt investment stocks, 1970 

























The three volume measures show the same pattern. Stocks of cross border investment have been 
increasing since the late 1970s-early 1980s, conforming to the usual perception that capital 
mobility has been increasing for the last couple of decades. The standard deviation of EU foreign 
direct and portfolio investment stocks increased during the period as well, except for portfolio 
debt stocks for which the standard error stabilized during the 1990s. An increase in the dispersion 
implies a divergence in the degree of capital mobility around the increasing trend, which is 
somewhat counter to the usual perception and gives an indication of the uncertainty of using this 
measure as a measure of the degree of capital mobility. Cross border capital flows may to a 
higher degree be driven by increases in wealth than by capital mobility per se, and to control for 
this effect, stocks should be divided by net wealth rather than GDP. However, data on net wealth 
is not available. There are several other drawbacks to using this approach to measuring capital 
mobility. As mentioned above, the volume approach to measuring capital mobility rests on the 
assumption that increases in the mobility of capital results in actual cross border capital flows. 
This assumption is a weak point of this approach, as investment decisions do not necessarily 
respond to increases in the mobility of capital if there are no price incentives to respond to, and 




the cross border transaction has not changed. At the same time, it is very possible that increases 
in capital mobility result in changes in asset prices rather than offsetting capital flows. 
 
The price approach 
 
Covered Interest Parity differentials (CIP) 
As mentioned in the paragraph on the dummy approach to measuring capital mobility, using 
dummies for the existence of capital restrictions does not sufficiently describe the degree of 
capital mobility. Moreover, increased capital mobility may tend to equalize prizes (i.e. interest 
rates) rather than producing actual capital flows, as mentioned in the paragraph on the volume 
approach. A way of getting around both critiques is to look at the price differential directly. 
Based on the assumption that the higher the price differential net of currency risk between two 
identical assets of different nationality, the higher restrictions, formal or informal, to capital 
mobility must be since price-offsetting flows have not been triggered to take advantage of the 
arbitrage opportunity. In other words, in a regime of perfect capital mobility, some sort of interest 
parity condition should hold while the lower the degree of capital mobility is, the higher a 
differential from interest parity should be possible without triggering arbitrage activity.  
 
Adam et al. (2001) give a very thorough overview of different measures of financial market 
integration based on the divergence from the law of one price. Measures of bond and credit 
market integration include international comparisons of interest on similar bank deposits 
(Centeno and Mello (1999), Kleimeier and Sander (2000), among other studies use such 
measures), international differences in similar banking products, as well as divergence from 
interest parity of similar financial assets (Lemmen and Eijffinger (1996)) and changes in the 
degree of M&A activity. Measures based on the law of one price have the same drawbacks and 
potential pitfalls in common: the products compared have to be very similar in terms of risk and 
liquidity profile for the differential in price to be an indicator of market segmentation. This 
drawback poses a substantial constraint on the number of assets, which can be used for the 
purpose of measuring market integration and capital mobility.  
 
The covered interest parity differential for three months inter-bank deposits is very commonly 
used for measuring interest parity differentials due to the availability of data as well as the 
homogeneity of inter-bank deposits across borders. For these reasons, as well as the fact that the 
measure provides both time and cross-country variation, this measure of capital mobility will also 
be used here. 
 
Covered interest parity is based on the notion that the return on two identical assets denominated 
in different currencies should be the same when currency risk is hedged in the forward market, 
default risk and liquidity characteristics of the two assets are the same and capital is perfectly 
mobile. The differential from covered interest parity can hence be written:  
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where ρ  is the covered interest parity differential at time t with respect to an asset of a maturity of 
δ , r is interest on the domestic asset, r* is the interest on the foreign asset, F is the forward 
exchange rate at time t for time t+δ  and S is the spot exchange rate at time t, expressed in 
domestic currency per foreign currency. The differential can consist of differential default risk of 
the two assets, differential liquidity premiums of the two assets, differential transaction costs or 
capital controls. It is therefore important to choose assets, which are as similar as possible with 
respect to default risk and liquidity in order to minimize the measurement error of the two latter 
components of the differential which amount to capital mobility.  
 
Ideally, interest and exchange rate data observed on the same time of day and the same day 
should be used to calculate the differential, but collecting such data for a panel of EU countries 
limits the sample size substantially compared to using monthly averages of the relevant variables. 
Since the availability of data on monthly averages is better and following Lemmen (1996), 
monthly averages of data on 3-month inter-bank deposit interest rates, 3-month forward exchange 
rates and spot rates from Datastream and OECD Main Economic Indicators are used to calculate 
CIPs for 14 European Union countries. In the defense of using monthly averages, note that if 
interest parity holds for data sampled at the same time in the month, then it should also hold for 
monthly averages. On the other hand, a value close to zero of the CIP calculated using monthly 
averages does not necessarily imply that interest parity holds for data collected at the same time 
in the month, implying that using monthly averages may tend to understate the differentials from 
interest parity. This potential for understatement should be kept in mind when analyzing the 
estimates. 
 
The absolute differentials from covered interest parity vis-à-vis Germany will be used as the third 
measure of capital mobility in the empirical analysis. Using Germany and not a third country 
(e.g. the US) as base country rests on the hypothesis that Germany had close to free capital 
movements for the entire period. This hypothesis is supported by the Quinn’s 14-point index, 
which designates Germany as having had close to perfectly financially since 1970, contrary to 
any other OECD country
43. Since Germany is the base country, the series is set to zero for 
Germany for the entire period. Moreover, due to the integrated inter-bank market post January 
1999, the series for all EMU member countries are set to zero after this date while the absolute 
differential remains positive for the UK, Sweden and Denmark. The longest series allowed by 
availability of both future and spot exchange rates and inter-bank deposit rates is for Spain, 
starting in 1977. However, the CIP is highly volatile between 1977 and 1990 (going from 11 
percent to 2 percent and back to 11 percent in a few years). Since such volatility is unlikely to be 
due to changes in capital mobility, and more likely to stem from changes in default, systemic or 
liquidity risk changes, only data from 1990 onward is therefore used for a Spanish measure of 
capital mobility. The EU average CIP is shown in Figure   0-10. As for the gross investment 
position measures and Quinn’s 14 point index, the average absolute covered interest parity 
differential exhibits an increasing trend in capital mobility over the past 20 years, but the 
sequencing of increases in capital mobility implied by the CIP is different from the other two 
measures. The absolute CIP indicates that a high degree of capital mobility was reached already 
                                                    
43 Quinn’s 14 point index only takes the values 13 or 14 for the entire period for Germany, implying that Germany 
had very few capital controls from 1970 to 1997. This is contrary to all other OECD countries, which have values 
between 4 (Portugal) and 12.5 (US, Canada and Switzerland) in 1970, after which the score mostly increases for all 




in the early 1980s, while Quinn’s 14-point index shows a pattern of increasing capital mobility 
throughout the period and the investment stock indicators show that capital mobility increased 
with an increasing rate over the period in question. The dispersion around the European mean 
absolute interest parity differential also fell during most of the period, except for increasing 
slightly after 1992, a possible consequence of the 1992 European currency crisis which may have 
affected perceived systemic risk of the European banking sectors, and in turn default risk and 
liquidity premiums. 
 
When using the CIP as a measure of the degree of capital mobility in panel regressions of 
equation (   0-1), it is interesting to note that contrary to the results of the unit root tests of all other 
measures of tax burdens and capital mobility, a unit root is clearly rejected when monthly country 
series are used, suggesting that the levels of the CIP are stationary (see Data Appendix). This 
result could be taken to suggest that the levels rather than the first differences of the CIP could be 
included in the otherwise first differenced regressions. However, since the level and not the 
change in the CIP is a measure of the degree of capital mobility, and since yearly and not 
monthly observations of the CIP are used in the regressions and unit root tests of these are 
inconclusive due to the short time series, the CIP is included in first differences in the basic 
specification. 
 
Figure   0-10: EU monthly average and standard deviation of absolute covered interest parity differentials (CIP), 1975 




























An alternative to the short-term covered interest differential would be to calculate covered 
interest differentials for long-term assets, as a measure of capital mobility of long-term financial 
assets. However, no convincing methodology seems to have been devised as of yet for 
calculating such interest differentials
44. 
 
                                                    
44 Popper (1993) provides a methodology for calculating long-term interest differentials, but the approach has 
conceptual problems which make the methodology problematic. Using currency swap rates as well as interest swap 
rates, she converts the yield of the foreign currency asset into a domestic currency yield and compares, but does not 
take into account that the same yield may be derived from different coupon/principal profiles of the foreign currency 




Cross border asset price correlations 
Another measure belonging to the category of price measures of capital mobility is cross border 
equity price correlations. It can be argued that when the mobility of capital is higher, capital 
should respond more easily to market specific changes in risk and return to equity by seeking 
other countries with better risk return profiles, all else equal. Hence, equity prices should co-vary 
across countries. However, using ex-post cross-country equity price correlations as a measure of 
cross border capital mobility has many potential pitfalls. Among these are that co-variation may 
be due to common shocks rather than capital flows responding to changes in cross border 
differences in price or uncertainty driven by country specific events
45. Similar problems are 
present for ex-post cross-country bond price correlations as a measure of capital mobility, and 
cross-country asset price correlations will therefore not be added to the battery of capital mobility 
indicators employed here. To avoid correlations being driven by common shocks rather than by 
market integration, ex-ante returns to equity can be estimated using a asset-pricing model 
specification. Several authors have attempted this approach, notably Hardouvelis, Malliaropoulis 
and Priestly (1999), who apply this methodology to European countries. Although a very 
promising approach to measuring capital mobility, applying this sophisticated methodology is out 
of the scope of this study. 
  
The macro approach 
The macro approach to measuring the degree of capital mobility includes two measures: within-
country savings-investment correlations and cross-country consumption correlations.  
 
Savings investment correlations are used as a measure of capital mobility since the less savings 
and investment are correlated within a country, the more access that country must have to 
international financial markets to smooth investment, and the higher should be the degree of 
capital mobility. Feldstein and Horioka (1980), and more recently Hussein (1998) and Lehner 
(1998) use the approach. Consumption correlations across countries are used as a measure of 
capital mobility because the higher degree of correlation of consumption across countries, the 
more access consumers of each country must have to international financial markets to smooth 
consumption and share risk, and the higher is the degree of capital mobility. Sorensen and Yosha 
(1997) and Adam et al. (2001) are examples of an application of this approach to EU countries. 
Important critiques of the two measures of capital mobility have been put forth. One such critique 
is that savings and investment as well as cross-country consumption can be correlated due to 
common shocks rather than a lack of financial integration - the same problem with the use of 
cross-country asset price correlations as a measure of financial integration
46. Moreover, the 
measures are usually calculated as a single correlation coefficient for a country or for a group of 
countries. Thus, these measures do not produce a time and country dependent index of capital 
mobility, which would be needed in a panel regression. Macro-based measures of the degree of 
capital mobility will therefore not be used here. 
  
                                                    
45 Obstfeld and Taylor (2001) look at equity price correlations to evaluate changes in the degree of international 
capital mobility over the last century. They show that changes in correlations do not correspond closely with the 
consensus u-shape perception of the degree of capital mobility over the last century. Rather, correlations are likely to 
stem from common shocks (which was clearly the case in the 1920s and 1930s) rather than globalization per se. 




Main points concerning measures of capital mobility 
Four approaches to constructing a measure of the degree of capital mobility have been presented. 
First, the legal/formal approach, which identifies whether restrictions to the cross border 
movement of capital are formally in state. Second, the volume approach which take the volume 
of cross border capital transactions as a measure of the degree of capital mobility. Third, the price 
approach, which is based on the notion that capital will move to equate prices across borders if it 
is free to do so, and hence uses cross border asset price disparities or correlations as an indicator 
or the degree of capital mobility. And finally, the macro approach based on the assumption that 
free access to international capital markets should result in consumption smoothing and the 
detachment of investment and savings within countries. Three measures, one from each of the 
first three approaches, will be used as measures of the degree of capital mobility in the panel 
regression analysis of the next section due to their characteristics of providing both time and 
cross-country variation as well as their relative appropriateness as measures of capital mobility: 
Quinn’s 14 point index of financial openness (also referred to as Quinn14), FDI stock in percent 
of GDP (also referred to as FDI) and absolute covered interest parity differentials (also referred to 
as CIP). Table   0-2 summarizes which measures are used in the different tests of the next section. 
 
Each of the measures identified above have significant drawbacks, however, and extensive 
research into devising new measures of capital mobility and financial integration is warranted. 
The ongoing Adam et al. (2002) study of indicators of financial integration in the European 
Union is a step in this direction. Their series of indicators are not available as this is being 
written, however. 
  Measuring Country Size and the Degree of Agglomeration 
Testing the hypothesis concerning the effect of economic size of a country on the tax competition 
equilibrium calls for a measure of economic size.  
 
Bocuvetski (1988) looks at differences in population size when investigating the theoretical 
implications of asymmetries in the size of countries engaged in tax competition, implying that 
population size could be used as a measure of country size for testing the asymmetry hypothesis. 
However, Bucovetski assumes that all citizens are identical and hold the same amount of savings 
to invest, and hence that differences in population size result in a proportional difference in the 
endowment of investable savings and fixed factors of the countries. According to the model, the 
endowment of capital as well as immobile labor
47 rather than population size is what affects the 
elasticity of the marginal product of capital and hence the optimal tax rate. Since composite 
measures of factor endowment are not available, GDP relative to total EU GDP will be used as a 
proxy
48. Figure   0-11 and Figure   0-12 show scatter plots of average size and implicit tax rates and 
corporate tax revenues in percent of GDP respectively. The plots show that a clear relationship 
between size and capital taxation is not evident. 
                                                    
47 The endowment of immobile labor matters in that it changes the marginal productively to capital in the basic tax 
competition model. Hence, to be strict, it is the endowment of labor scaled with its productivity which matters, but 
these are details that will not be further developed here.  
48 What matters for the equilibrium tax rate in asymmetric models is relative and not absolute size. If real GDP 
increases in all competing countries in the same year, this should not matter for the equilibrium tax rate. Hence, the 
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When testing the central predictions of the economic geography literature for tax competition, a 
measure of agglomeration is needed. In identifying the kind of agglomeration in question in the 
agglomeration models of tax competition, an important conceptual problem becomes evident. 
Since the present study is country based, a measure of agglomeration on country scale, including 
aggregate production, is needed, whereas the empirical literature on agglomeration economies 
only provides industry or sub-region specific measures of agglomeration economies
49.  
 
                                                    
49 These measures include the Balassa index and the derived locational Gini-coefficient, see for example Mary Amiti 




Agglomeration economies are therefore measured here as real gross domestic product per 
capita
50. GDP per capita is measured in millions of dollars in fixed 1995 prices per capita. 
  
Figure   0-13 shows the average agglomeration index for each country plotted against the average 
implicit tax rate on capital for the period 1980 to 1997. The positive relationship is clear, with 
only the observation for the UK breaking the trend: the more economic activity per capita, the 
higher the implicit tax rate on capital, lending support to the new economic geography 
predictions for capital mobility and capital income taxation. This positive link between 
agglomeration and capital income taxation becomes less clear when corporate tax revenues in 
percent of GDP is used. Figure   0-14 shows that here, the relationship is rather bell-shaped, and 
might be due to the fact that more economic activity means higher GDP, such that the numerator 
of the tax measure goes up as well as the denominator, when agglomeration increases. This 
should be kept in mind when the empirical analysis is carried out, and hypothesis 5 is therefore 
only tested using the implicit tax rate. 
 
















































                                                    
50 Alternatively, manufacturing value added per capita could be used, but since it does only include one aspect of 



























































  Summary of Data Sources and Measures 
Most of the data for the econometric analysis of the five hypotheses comes from OECD Revenue 
Statistics and OECD Economic Outlook, with some exceptions. Precise sources and definitions 
are given in Data Appendix. Data on capital mobility, tax burdens, asymmetries and 
agglomeration are not directly available. This section has discussed and identified measures of 
these variables to be used in the empirical analysis.  
 
The method proposed by Carey and Tchilinguirian (2000) is adopted for calculating implicit tax 
rates on labor and capital. Moreover, simple corporate tax revenues in percept of GDP as well as 
in percent of total tax revenues will be used as well. Several measures of capital mobility are 
identified, and three measures are adopted in this study. Asymmetries in country size are proxied 
by the fraction of EU real gross domestic product produced in the country in question. Finally, 
the potential for agglomeration economies is measured by real gross domestic product per capita. 
Table   0-2 summarizes the choices and definitions of the variables used for testing each of the five 





Table   0-2. Overview of hypotheses to be tested and the hypothesis specific dependent and explanatory variables used 
in the panel regression analysis.  
 
Hypothesis Dependent(s)  variable(s)  Hypotheses specific explanatory 
variable(s) 
H1  The higher the capital mobility, 
the lower the primary 
government expenditures 
Primary expenditures in 
percent of GDP. 
•  Quinn14 
•  FDI stocks 
•  CIP 
H2  The higher the capital mobility, 
the lower the tax revenues from 
and tax burden of capital 
income taxed at the source 
Tax burden on capital 
measured by the implicit 
capital tax rate and 
corporate tax revenues in 
percent of GDP 
•  Quinn14 
•  FDI stocks 
•  CIP 
H3  The higher the degree of capital 
mobility, the higher the tax rate 
on labor relative to that of 
capital income 
Tax burden on capital 
relative to the tax burden 
on labor measured by the 
implicit capital tax rate in 
percent of the implicit tax 
rate on labor, and 
corporate tax revenues in 
percent of total tax 
revenues 
•  Quinn14 
•  FDI stocks 
•  CIP 
H4  The larger the country, the 
smaller the downward pressure 
of capital mobility on the 
capital tax rate 
Tax burden on capital 
measured by the implicit 
capital tax rate and 
corporate tax revenues in 
percent of GDP 
•  Quinn14 
•  FDI stocks 
•  CIP  
Alone and interaction with the 
percentage of EU real GDP produced 
in the country. 
 
H5  The more production is 
clustered in a country, the 
lower the effect of capital 
mobility on the tax rate 
Tax burden on capital 
measured by the implicit 
capital tax rate 
•  Quinn14 
•  FDI stocks 
•  CIP  
Alone and interaction with GDP per 
capita. 
 
6.  Results of the Empirical Analysis 
 Estimation  Procedure 
Table   0-3 shows the results of the regressions of the basic specification for each of the dependent 
variables, which will be used for testing the five hypotheses, excluding hypothesis specific 
explanatory variables. Even though there is data for some variables and some countries back to 
1970 for the regressions using corporate tax revenues as dependent variables, the sample range 
has been restricted to exclude data from the 1970s. The reason is that the standard errors of the 
parameter estimates of the control variables fall significantly when the 1970s are not included, as 
can be seen when comparing with the results of the regressions including all available 
observations, shown in Table   0-15 in Appendix
51. The sample thus runs from 1980 to 1999. 
 
                                                    
51 When carrying out Chow tests of a structural break between 1980 and 1990, no structural breaks are accepted by 




The regressions are estimated using FGLS, allowing for cross-country contemporaneous 
correlation of the error terms as well cross sectional heteroskedasticity. The Hausman tests for 
fixed effects against the alternative of random effects are all accepted, implying that the fixed 
effects model is the more appropriate of the two one-way error components models. Moreover, 
the test for the country fixed effects jointly being equal to zero rejects the null in all regressions 
on a 5 percent significance level, with the exception of the regression of corporate tax revenues in 
percent of total revenues
52. The fixed effects one-way error components specification is therefore 
kept. Concerning the goodness of fit of the regressions, an F-test of the slope coefficients being 
jointly equal to zero is rejected in all five regressions
53. 
 
All parameter estimates of explanatory variables are either insignificant or significant with the 
expected sign in the five regressions shown in Table   0-3, with two exceptions. The dummy for 
partisanship, LEFT, is significantly positive in the regressions on corporate tax revenues relative 
to GDP and total tax revenues (B and C), contrary to the usual perception of left wing 
expenditure policy
54, and contrary to the conclusions of Persson and Tabellini (1992). But the 
native sign may also be the previously mentioned tax base effect. A left-wing government may 
enact policies which potentially lower the corporate tax base effect. Moreover, PART enters 
significantly positively in the implicit tax rate regressions, opposite to expectation. An interesting 
result for the control variables is the parameter estimates for the Maastricht Treaty dummy, which 
come out strongly significant and with the expected sign in the primary expenditure regressions 
as well as the two regressions of corporate tax revenues. This implies that the Maastricht budget 
restrictions have had a significant impact on fiscal policy in EU member states, and indicates 
moreover that corporate taxation has taken more of the adjustment toward balancing budgets than 
other types of taxation. 
 
 Results 
The CIP has been multiplied by minus one in the following, so that an increase in the -CIP 
implies an increase in capital mobility in line with the FDI and the Quinn14 measures of capital 
mobility. 
 
Test of Hypothesis 1: The effect of capital mobility on primary spending 
The hypothesis that higher capital mobility results in lower primary spending in EU countries is 
tested by regressing primary expenditures in percent of GDP on the three measures of capital 
mobility identified in Section   5 in addition to the 7 control variables. The regression results are 
shown in Table   0-4. 
                                                    
52 For which the hypothesis of zero fixed effects has a significance probability of 9 percent. 
53 The R2 of the regressions are also reported in Table   0-3, but are not meaningful when FGLS estimation is used, 
and are therefore not commented on.  
 
54 This is not due to the variable capturing an election year effect since including a dummy taking the value one in 





Table   0-3: The basic regressions excluding hypothesis specific explanatory variables, specification tests 
Dependent 
Variable 
A. Primary expenditures in 
% of GDP 
B. Corporate tax revenues in 
percent of GDP 
C. Corporate tax revenues in 





estimate t-stat  p-value 
Para- 
meter 
estimate t-stat  p-value 
Para- 
meter 
estimate t-stat  p-value 
GR-1  -0.083  -2.416  0.017  0.025 3.300 0.001 0.068 3.761 0.000 
INFL-1  0.0248  1.256  0.211  0.007 2.301 0.022 0.007 0.835 0.405 
∆OPEN-1 0.0208  3.110  0.002  -0.003  -3.046  0.003  -0.006  -1.833  0.068 
∆PART-1 0.0347  0.453  0.651  -0.002  -0.137  0.891  -0.043  -1.003  0.317 
LEFT -0.064  -0.546  0.586  -0.116  -3.469  0.001  -0.296  -3.863  0.000 
∆UN-1 -0.086  -1.302  0.194  -0.039  -2.921  0.004  -0.102  -3.006  0.003 
MAAS-1  -1.384  -5.615  0.000  0.272 8.797 0.000 0.666 9.159 0.000 
No. Obs  235      242      242     
Hausmann 4.059    0.77  8.18    0.317  7.810    0.35 
Wald (fixed effects=0)  6.140    0.00  2.07    0.014  1.554    0.09 
F-test (all slopes=0)  7.900    0.00  21.681    0.00  27.120    0.00 
DW statistic  2.176      1.906      1.833     
R2 0.113      0.172      0.189     
Table   0-3 continued: The basic regressions excluding hypothesis specific explanatory variables, specification tests 
Dependent 
Variable 
D. Implicit capital tax rate  E. Implicit tax rate on capital 






estimate t-stat  p-value 
Para- 
meter 
estimate t-stat  p-value 
GR-1  -0.036  -0.236  0.814  0.004 1.051 0.295 
INFL-1 -0.048  -0.875  0.383  -0.012  -6.288  0.000 
∆OPEN-1  0.054 1.908 0.058  0.004  2.817  0.005 
∆PART-1  1.237 3.905 0.000  0.017  2.019  0.045 
LEFT  0.045 0.088 0.930  0.004  0.237  0.813 
∆UN-1 -2.239  -8.717  0.000  -0.069  -8.868  0.000 
MAAS-1  0.566 1.269 0.206  0.003  0.177  0.860 
No. Obs  211      211     
Hausmann 7.203    0.48  9.650    0.21 
Wald (fixed effects=0)  3.306   0.00  3.713    0.00 
F-test (all slopes=0)  30.026   0.00  41.661    0.00 
DW statistic  1.985     1.810     
R2  0.240     0.290     













estimate t-stat  p-value 
Para- 
meter 
estimate t-stat  p-value 
Para- 
meter 
estimate t-stat  p-value 
∆Icap-1  0.012 0.184 0.854 -0.035 -1.253  0.212  -0.282 -2.888 0.005 
GR-1 -0.094  -2.556  0.011  -0.082  -2.384  0.018  -0.091  -2.046  0.043 
INFL-1  0.028 1.340 0.182  0.025  1.247  0.214  0.131  4.076  0.000 
∆OPEN-1  0.021 3.080 0.002  0.021  3.167  0.002  -0.035 -3.644 0.000 
∆PART-1  0.035 0.443 0.658  0.016  0.205  0.838  0.322  3.494  0.001 
LEFT -0.061  -0.533  0.595  -0.051  -0.441  0.660  -0.520  -3.063  0.003 
∆UN-1  -0.107  -1.550  0.123  -0.085  -1.292 0.198 0.008 0.105 0.917 
MAAS-1 -1.354  -5.394  0.000  -1.368  -5.575  0.000  -0.791  -4.462  0.000 
No. Obs  235       235       132      
DW statistic  2.179     2.171      1.484     
R2  0.112       0.112       0.304      
 
Of the three measures of capital mobility, only the -CIP measure of capital mobility significantly 
explains some of the variation in primary expenditures in EU countries, supporting hypothesis 
one
55. A narrowing of the absolute covered interest parity differential of 1 percentage point is 
estimated to reduce primary expenditures in percent of GDP by 0.28 percentage points. Since the 
EU average CIP narrowed by about 4 percentage points from the early 1980s till the late 1990s, 
this would imply that on the average, primary expenditures in percent of GDP in EU countries 
were reduced by a little more than 1 percentage point during that time period due to increased 
capital mobility, a rather modest effect. 
 
However, the parameter estimate of the -CIP is not robust to changes in the sample countries as 
well as to including short-term interest rates and election year effects in the regression (see Table  
0-16 and Table   0-17 in Appendix)
56. Moreover, the introduction of the -CIP in the regression 
turns the parameter estimates of PART and LEFT significant, but with the wrong signs. 
Moreover, there are signs of positive autocorrelation in the regressing using –CIP as a measure of 
capital mobility, and this observation together with the above mentioned lack of robustness of the 
parameter estimate to the explanatory variables included in the regression implies that more work 
could be done on the specification of the regression of primary expenditures
57. All of these 
                                                    
55 Including FDI flows instead of FDI stocks (not shown) does not render the FDI variable significant, and this is the 
case in all other regressions in which the FDI variable is insignificant. The relatively poor performance in terms of 
explanatory power of this measure is hence not due to the choice of stocks vs. flows. 
56 The robustness to short-term interest rates is checked since the -CIP measure is correlated with short-term interest 
rates with a correlation coefficient of 0.25. Table   0-17 shows that short-term interest rates are significantly correlated 
with primary spending, and it is therefore likely that the significantly negative parameter estimate of the -CIP 
captures some of the variation in primary expenditures which is due correlation with interest rates. Notice, also, that 
the election year effects are significant, but the expected election cycle of increasing expenditures leading up to the 
election and a reduction of expenditures after the election is not supported by the data. 
57 Whether the DW statistic of the -CIP regression of 1.484 is significantly different from 2 cannot be established due 
to lack of available tabled significance levels for the characteristics of panel used in this study. Bhargava, A., L. 




observations imply that the parameter estimate of the -CIP in the primary expenditures regression 
is rather uncertain. There is hence no robust support of the hypothesis that primary expenditures 
are lower when capital mobility increases in EU countries. 
 
Test of Hypothesis 2: The effect of capital mobility on capital taxation 
Hypothesis two stating that higher capital mobility results in less taxation of capital in EU 
countries, is tested by regressing corporate tax revenues in percent of GDP and the implicit 
capital tax rate on the three measures of capital mobility identified in Section   5. The outcomes of 
the six resulting regressions are shown in Table   0-5 and Table   0-6 below.  









estimate  t-stat p-value 
Para- 
meter 
estimate  t-stat p-value 
Para- 
meter 
estimate  t-stat p-value 
∆Icap-1  0.049 2.692 0.008 -0.010 -1.777  0.077  -0.101 -2.889 0.005 
GR-1  0.025 3.332 0.001  0.026  3.491  0.001  0.028  2.020  0.046 
INFL-1  0.007 2.159 0.032  0.007  2.171  0.031  0.002  0.236  0.814 
∆OPEN-1 -0.003  -2.858  0.005  -0.003  -2.817  0.005  -0.016  -5.038  0.000 
∆PART-1 -0.004  -0.223  0.824  -0.006  -0.364  0.716  -0.027  -0.966  0.336 
LEFT -0.119  -3.659  0.000  -0.113  -3.469  0.001  -0.148  -3.502  0.001 
∆UN-1 -0.037  -2.728  0.007  -0.037  -2.817  0.005  -0.003  -0.109  0.913 
MAAS-1  0.275 8.406 0.000  0.284  9.072  0.000  0.192  3.556  0.001 
No. Obs  242      242      133     
DW statistic  1.900      1.910      2.139     
R2 0.178      0.175      0.266     
 









estimate t-stat  p-value 
Para- 
meter 
estimate t-stat  p-value 
Para- 
meter 
estimate t-stat  p-value 
∆Icap-1  -0.140  -0.514  0.608  0.055 0.595 0.553  -1.677  -3.748  0.000 
GR-1  -0.022  -0.147  0.883  -0.032  -0.211 0.833 0.179 1.101 0.273 
INFL-1 -0.050  -0.881  0.379  -0.047  -0.859  0.392  -0.037  -0.363  0.718 
∆OPEN-1  0.055 1.893 0.060  0.053  1.887  0.061  -0.155 -3.044 0.003 
∆PART-1  1.243 3.916 0.000  1.223  3.854  0.000  0.938  2.388  0.019 
LEFT  0.051 0.099 0.921  0.044  0.086  0.931  -0.846 -2.026 0.045 
∆UN-1 -2.234  -8.579  0.000  -2.236  -8.705  0.000  -1.783  -5.942  0.000 
MAAS-1  0.555 1.176 0.241  0.537  1.198  0.233  0.559  0.819  0.415 
No. Obs  211      211      130     
DW statistic  1.984      1.985      0.290     
R2 0.241      0.240      2.146     
                                                                                                                                                                           
limited number of combinations of time dimension, cross sections and number explanatory variables. The low value 





Quinn￿s 14-point index: 
When Quinn14 is used as indicator of the degree of capital mobility in the regression of corporate 
tax revenues in percent of GDP, the significantly positive parameter estimate implies that 
increasing financial liberalization leads to increasing corporate tax revenues, opposite to the 
predictions of the tax competition literature and in line with the results of previous empirical 
literature on tax competition for OECD countries reviewed in Section   3. The estimated effect of a 
one-point increase in Quinn’s 14-point index is a 0.049 percentage points increase in corporate 
tax revenues in percent of GDP. Given that the EU average increase in Quinn’s 14-point index 
from 1980 to 1997 was 3.4 points, this implies a 0.167 percentage point increase in corporate tax 
revenues to GDP resulting from an increase in Quinn’s 14-point index. Given that the EU average 
corporate tax revenues in percent of GDP fluctuated between one and four percentage points 
during the sample period, this effect is not unimportant, corresponding to a relative increase in 
corporate tax revenues in percent of GDP of 9.3 percent
58. The significantly positive correlation 
between Quinn’s 14 point index and corporate tax revenues in percent of GDP is robust to 
changes in the countries included in the panel (Table   0-19), the inclusion of additional 
explanatory variables (Table   0-21) and to the inclusion of growth and inflation in first differences 
(Table   0-23).  
 
Quinn’s 14-point index is, however, not significant in the regression of the implicit tax rate on 
capital. 
 
The positive correlation of Quinn14 and corporate tax revenues in percent of GDP could be 
understood as support for the political economy hypothesis that higher capital mobility leads to 
the electorate moving further toward the left in order to counteract tax competition, and in turn 
leading to higher taxes. But since the dummy for left wing governments does not show a 
statistically significant preference of left wing government for higher capital taxation (rather the 
contrary), and since the CIP measure of capital mobility does not support this take on the results, 
this line of reasoning is not pursued any further.  
 
Getting back to the list of potential reasons for the positive correlations found in the previous 
empirical literature, a few of these reasons may apply here. First, Quinn￿s 14 point index may be 
a poor measure of the degree of actual capital mobility, due to it￿s formal/legal approach (see the 
section on measures of capital mobility). But this does not explain the robustly significant nature 
of the index. Regarding point two on the list, finding a significantly positive parameter estimate 
in the corporate tax to GDP regression, while the result is insignificant in the implicit capital tax 
rate regression, might imply that the positive correlation is a tax base effect. Unfortunately, it has 
not been possible to identify a convincing measure of the corporate tax base to test this 
presumption. Moreover, since using the CIP does not show the same pattern, a tax base effect is 
not likely to be the explanation. Rather, the reason should be inherent to the Quinn14 measure 
and not the tax measure
59. Following point 3, Quinn’s 14-point index could be suspected to be 
                                                    
58 Relative to the corporate tax revenues in percent of GDP in 1980 
59 In an attempt to check whether such a tax base effect is likely to be the root of the positive correlation, the implicit 
corporate tax rate is used as dependent variable in spite of the substantial problems related to this measure. This 
measure of the tax burden on corporations is discussed in Section   5. It is not used as a primary measure of the tax 
burden due to lack of data and because the operating surplus is an ￿ at best - imperfect measure of the corporate tax 




correlated with the upward trend in overall tax revenues during the sample period, in which case 
the measure would be capturing an overall trend of growth in tax revenues instead of the effect of 
capital mobility on corporate tax revenues. Testing this hypothesis by including overall tax 
revenues in percent of GDP in the regression (Table   0-25), rejects this hypothesis
60.  
 
Finally, it is interesting that when agglomeration effects are taken into account in testing 
hypothesis 5 below, the parameter estimates for Quinn14 becomes significantly negative. 
Moreover, Quinn14 is correlated with the index of agglomeration with a correlation coefficient of 
0.57. Hence, the positive value of the parameter estimate of Quinn14 might therefore be 
suspected to capture an omitted variables bias due to not taking into account the asymmetric 
responses of core and peripheral countries. Another potential source of omitted variables bias 
listed in Section   3 was that when countries get richer, they might liberalize and increase their 
taxes, such that income level is what is driving both variables. If this source of omitted variables 
bias is the cause of the positive correlation, including income per capita in the regression should 
change the parameter estimate of Quinn14. As can be seen in Table   0-27, this is not the case. The 
best candidate for an explanation of the positive correlation between Quinn14 and corporate tax 
revenues in percent of GDP therefore remains the omission of agglomeration effects from the 
estimating equation.  
 
FDI: 
When the FDI measure of capital mobility is used as indicator of capital mobility in the 
regression of corporate tax revenues in percent of GDP, the parameter estimate is found to be 
significantly negative, thus supporting hypothesis two
61. But the parameter estimate of the FDI 
measure in the corporate tax revenues to GDP regression does not pass any of the robustness tests 
shown in Table   0-19 to Table   0-28, and can therefore not be taken as a solid support for the tax 
competition hypothesis. Moreover, the FDI measure is not significant in the implicit capital tax 
rate regression. The FDI measure of capital mobility in general fares very poorly in all 
regressions, and is therefore not given much attention in the remainder of the Chapter. 
 
CIP: 
When the -CIP index is included in the regression of corporate tax revenues in percent of GDP, 
the correlation between dependent and the -CIP is significantly negative, lending support to 
hypothesis 2. The estimated effect of a one-percentage point narrowing of the absolute interest 
parity differential is to lower corporate tax revenues in percent of GDP by 0.101 percentage 
points. Since EU average CIP narrowed by about 4 percentage points from the early 1980s to the 
late 1990s (see Figure   0-10), this implies an impact of capital mobility of an average EU 
corporate tax revenues in percent of GDP of -0.403 percentage points, all else equal. In relative 
                                                                                                                                                                           
indicates that the positive correlation found does not provide support for the hypothesis of a above might not be a 
result of a tax base effect, although given the problems with the tax base measure of the implicit corporate tax rate, 
this might still be the problem. 
60 Moreover, splitting up the sample into exemption countries and limited credit countries (see the paragraph on 
capital taxation in the EU), did not qualitatively change the results. 
61 A one percentage point increase in inward and outward FDI stocks in percent of GDP is found to results in 0.01 
percentage point lower corporate tax revenues in percent of GDP. Since the FDI measure increased by about 20 
percentage points from the early 1980s to the late 1990s, this means that corporate tax revenues in percent of GDP 
should have fallen by 0.2 percentage points during this period due to increased capital mobility; a rather modest 




terms, this estimate corresponds to a 22.5 percent fall in corporate tax revenues in percent of 
GDP between the early 1980s and the late 1990s
62. The negative parameter estimate for the -CIP 
in the corporate tax revenues to GDP regression is robust to changes in the countries included in 
the sample (Table   0-19), to the inclusion of other explanatory variables (Table   0-21 and Table  
0-25), as well as to the inclusion of growth and inflation in first differences (Table   0-23). 
 
In the regression of the implicit capital tax rate, the parameter estimate of the -CIP also comes 
out significantly negative, lending further support to hypothesis 2. More specifically, a one-
percentage point narrowing of the absolute interest parity differential is found to result in a 1.677 
percentage point fall in the implicit capital tax rate. This implies a 6.7 percentage point fall in the 
EU average implicit capital tax rate from 1980 to 1997, corresponding to a 12.6 percent relative 
fall in the EU average implicit capital tax rate since 1980. The negative parameter estimate for 
the -CIP in the implicit capital tax regression is robust to changes in the countries included in the 
sample (Table   0-19), to the inclusion of other explanatory variables (Table   0-21 and Table   0-25), 
as well as to the inclusion of growth and inflation in first differences (Table   0-23) 
 
Test of Hypothesis 3: The effect of capital mobility on capital taxation relative to taxation of 
other factors 
The hypothesis that increased capital mobility shifts the tax burden from mobile capital toward 
the less mobile factors such as labor is tested regressing, respectively, corporate tax revenues in 
percent of total tax revenues and the implicit capital tax rate in percent of the implicit labor tax 
rate on the three measures of capital mobility. The regression results are shown in Table   0-7 and 
Table   0-8.   
 









estimate t-stat  p-value 
Para- 
meter 
estimate t-stat  p-value 
Para- 
meter 
estimate t-stat  p-value 
∆Icap-1  0.155 3.449 0.001 -0.021 -1.875  0.062  -0.258 -3.267 0.001 
GR-1  0.023 2.161 0.032  0.023  2.219  0.028  0.026  1.389  0.168 
INFL-1  0.003 0.197 0.844  0.006  0.493  0.623  -0.072 -2.182 0.031 
∆OPEN-1 -0.005  -1.479  0.141  -0.004  -1.234  0.219  -0.025  -3.483  0.001 
∆PART-1 -0.004  -0.097  0.923  -0.001  -0.032  0.974  -0.003  -0.046  0.964 
LEFT -0.267  -3.541  0.001  -0.258  -3.395  0.001  -0.279  -2.861  0.005 
∆UN-1 -0.168  -6.060  0.000  -0.167  -5.983  0.000  -0.083  -1.730  0.086 
MAAS-1  0.603 9.250 0.000  0.620  9.202  0.000  0.383  3.730  0.000 
No. Obs  242       242       133      
DW statistic  1.795      1.820     2.068     
R2  0.178       0.177       0.283      
 
                                                    
62 Calculated as the predicted average change in corporate tax revenues from 1980 to 1997 divided by the 1980 value 














estimate  t-stat p-value 
Para- 
meter 
estimate  t-stat p-value 
Para- 
meter 
estimate  t-stat p-value 
∆Icap-1  0.013 1.557 0.121  0.003  1.466  0.144  -0.045 -3.710 0.000 
GR-1 -0.011  -4.498  0.000  -0.012  -4.765  0.000  -0.008  -2.558  0.012 
INFL-1 -0.010  -3.099  0.002  -0.010  -3.034  0.003  -0.005  -1.142  0.256 
∆OPEN-1  0.002 1.444 0.151  0.002  1.423  0.156  -0.003 -1.864 0.065 
∆PART-1  0.022 2.939 0.004  0.023  3.024  0.003  0.036  3.802  0.000 
LEFT  0.009 0.564 0.574  0.006  0.388  0.699  -0.044 -2.610 0.010 
∆UN-1  -0.092  -13.67 0.000 -0.092 -13.506 0.000  -0.069 -8.476 0.000 
MAAS-1  0.042 3.197 0.002  0.037  2.760  0.006  0.003  0.231  0.818 
No. Obs  211      211      130     
DW statistic  1.843      1.841      2.229     
R2 0.297      0.297      0.360     
 
Quinn￿s 14-point index: 
Changes in Quinn’s 14-point index significantly positively explain changes in corporate tax 
revenues in percent of total tax revenues. A one-point increase in Quin14 is found to result in a 
0.155 percentage point increase in corporate to total tax revenues. Since the EU average of 
Quinn14 increased by 3.4 points between the early 1980s and the late 1990s, the parameter 
estimate implies that corporate tax revenues in percent of total tax revenues increased with 0.527 
percentage points due to increased capital mobility during that period. This corresponds to a 10 
percent relative increase in corporate tax revenues to total tax revenues between 1980 and 1997
63. 
 
The result is robust to changes in the sample of countries (Table   0-29), the inclusion of other 
variables (Table   0-31) and the inclusion of growth and inflation in first differences (Table   0-33), 
suggesting that recent increases in capital mobility have not resulted in shifts of the tax burden 
from capital to other factors, but rather that the contrary has taken place.  
 
Again, the reasons for this result may include a tax base effect, i.e. that the capital tax base is 
positively correlated with increases in capital mobility, as suggested in point 2 in the section 
reviewing the literature above. Moreover, the story of Quinn14 potentially capturing asymmetric 
tax competition or agglomeration effects cannot be ruled out and seems to be supported by the 
outcomes of the tests of hypothesis 5 below. On the other hand, point 3 concerning the trend in 
total tax revenues obviously does not apply. 
 
Quinn’s 14-point index is not significant in the regression of the implicit capital tax rate relative 
to the implicit tax rate on labor (Table   0-8) 
                                                    
63 This number comes from dividing the average estimated change due to capital mobility over the period from the 
early 1980s to the late 1990s with the EU average value of corporate tax revenues in percent of total tax revenues in 






When using FDI as indicator of capital mobility, this measure is found to be significantly 
negative in the regression of corporate tax revenues to total tax revenues, supporting hypothesis 
3
64. But the parameter estimate is not robust to changes in the sample countries
65. Moreover, the 
FDI index is not significant in the regression of the implicit capital tax rate in percent of the 
implicit labor tax rate. 
 
CIP: 
When the -CIP measure is used, the parameter estimate is found to be significantly negative in 
the regression of corporate tax revenues in percent of total tax revenues, thus supporting 
hypothesis 4. The parameter estimate of -0.258 implies that the EU average narrowing of the CIP 
between 1980 and 1997 of about 4 percentage points resulted in an EU average fall in corporate 
to total tax revenues of one percentage point, or a 20 percent decrease in corporate tax revenues 
to total tax revenues over that period. The parameter estimate is robust to changes in countries 
included in the sample (Table   0-38) and to the changes in the control variables (Table   0-40 and 
Table   0-42). 
 
The -CIP is also significantly negative in the regression of the implicit capital tax rate in percent 
of the implicit labor tax rate. A one-percentage point narrowing of the absolute covered interest 
parity differential is estimated to result in a 0.045 percentage point fall in the capital in percent of 
labor implicit tax rate. Given the EU average narrowing of the CIP of about 4 percentage points 
between the early 1980s and late 1990s, this implies an EU average fall in the capital to labor 
implicit tax rate of 18 percentage points due to increased capital mobility over that period, 
corresponding to a 9.5 percent fall in the fall in the capital to labor implicit tax rate since the early 
1980s
66. This parameter estimate is also robust to changes in the sample countries and control 
variables (Table   0-39, Table   0-41 and Table   0-43). 
 
Test of Hypothesis 4: The effect of asymmetry on the impact of capital mobility on capital 
taxation 
Whether the effect of capital mobility on tax rates depends on country size, as suggested by the 
asymmetric tax competition literature, is tested by regressing the two measures of capital taxation 
on the three measures of capital mobility alone and in interaction with the measure of economic 
size of the country (referred to as SIZE in the following). The results of the regressions are 
reported in Table   0-9 and Table   0-10. The interaction term is only significant and with the right 
sign in the regressions using Quinn￿s 14-point index as measure of capital mobility. However, the 
parameter estimates of the interaction terms in these regressions are not robust to changes in the 
sample countries (Table   0-38 and Table   0-39). 
                                                    
64 A one-percentage point increase in FDI is estimated to result in a -0.021 percentage point fall in corporate tax 
revenues to total revenues. The FDI measure increased by about 20 percentage points from the early 1980s to the late 
1990s, implying that corporate tax revenues in percent of total tax revenues should have fallen by 0.42 percentage 
points during this period due to increased capital mobility 
65 Table   0-29 shows that taking out either Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden or Spain renders the parameter 
estimate insignificant 
66 Calculated as the predicted change in the ratio due to increased capital mobility, divided by the EU average 
implicit capital tax to implicit labor tax of 1980. Since the ratio as been falling, the corresponding number for 1997 














estimate  t-stat p-value 
Para- 
meter 
estimate  t-stat p-value 
Para- 
meter 
estimate  t-stat p-value 
∆icap-1  0.034 1.672 0.096 -0.014 -2.361  0.019  -0.138 -2.470 0.015 
∆(Icap*SIZE)-1  0.003 1.777 0.077  0.001  1.570  0.118  0.471  0.988  0.326 
GR-1  0.026 3.346 0.001  0.027  3.673  0.000  0.025  1.846  0.068 
INFL-1  0.006 1.770 0.078  0.006  2.042  0.042  0.006  0.642  0.522 
∆OPEN-1 -0.003  -2.800  0.006  -0.003  -2.783  0.006  -0.016  -4.944  0.000 
∆PART-1 -0.009  -0.468  0.640  -0.012  -0.672  0.502  -0.025  -0.881  0.380 
LEFT -0.114  -3.507  0.001  -0.111  -3.439  0.001  -0.150  -3.638  0.000 
∆UN-1 -0.036  -2.672  0.008  -0.034  -2.643  0.009  -0.011  -0.419  0.676 
MAAS-1  0.268 8.383 0.000  0.281  8.992  0.000  0.194  3.653  0.000 
No. Obs  242      242      132     
DW statistic  1.977      1.893      2.101     
R2 0.182      0.175      0.258     
 









estimate t-stat  p-value 
Para- 
meter 
estimate t-stat  p-value 
Para- 
meter 
estimate t-stat  p-value 
∆icap-1  -0.649  -2.091  0.038  0.178 1.654 0.100  -1.539  -1.882  0.063 
∆(Icap*SIZE)-1  0.095 3.726 0.000 -0.025 -2.279  0.024  -0.871 -0.142 0.888 
GR-1  -0.003  -0.021  0.983  -0.021  -0.141 0.888 0.189 1.127 0.262 
INFL-1 -0.062  -1.210  0.228  -0.056  -1.034  0.303  -0.021  -0.185  0.854 
∆OPEN-1  0.059 2.273 0.024  0.054  1.907  0.058  -0.151 -2.694 0.008 
∆PART-1  0.979 2.890 0.004  1.327  4.188  0.000  0.916  2.332  0.022 
LEFT  0.377 0.708 0.480  0.003  0.007  0.995  -0.844 -1.852 0.067 
∆UN-1 -2.242  -8.824  0.000  -2.215  -8.671  0.000  -1.830  -5.360  0.000 
MAAS-1  0.571 1.273 0.205  0.711  1.581  0.116  0.623  0.900  0.370 
No. Obs  211      211      129     
DW statistic  1.977      1.975      2.148     
R2 0.248      0.238      0.289     
 
A potential reason for the lack of conclusive results in the regressions using FDI and CIP is that 
the variation in the SIZE variable is low. The interaction term between SIZE and the measure of 
capital mobility is hence rather correlated with the capital mobility index itself. This is 
particularly a problem in the regressions using CIP and FDI, where the correlation coefficient of 
the capital mobility index and the interaction term is over 0.6, and where the standard errors of 




corresponding correlation coefficient is only 0.15. Longer time series would be needed to correct 
this problem, which unfortunately, only time will provide. 
 
The regression of the implicit capital tax rate on the Quinn14 measure of capital mobility, for 
which multicollinarity does not seem to be a problem and for which tax base effects are less, 
show that the parameter estimates are as expected and significant. In conclusion, there is some 
evidence of a size asymmetry effect on capital tax rates. However, the evidence is not robust to 
changes in the sample countries. 
 
Test of Hypothesis 5: The effect of capital mobility and agglomeration economies on capital 
taxation 
Hypothesis five, stating that the higher the scope for agglomeration economies in the country, the 
less the country will be pressured by tax competition, is tested for the implicit capital tax rate by 
including an interaction term between the capital mobility measures and the measure of economic 
activity in addition to the capital mobility measure. Only the implicit tax rate measure is used 
since if economic activity is clustering in a country and there are economies of scale, GDP may 
be increasing even faster than the tax rate and tax revenues, making tax revenues in percent of 
GDP an unsuited measure. The results of the test regression for the implicit capital tax rate are 
shown in Table   0-11. 
 









estimate t-stat  p-value 
Para- 
meter 
estimate t-stat  p-value 
Para- 
meter 
estimate t-stat  p-value 
∆Icap-1 -1.846  -3.958  0.000  -0.048  -0.148  0.882  -0.069  -0.046  0.963 
∆(Icap*AGGLOM)-1  0.090 3.951 0.000 0.005  0.341  0.734 -7.200 -0.921  0.359 
GR-1  -0.090  -0.638  0.524  -0.042  -0.268 0.789 0.222 1.599 0.113 
INFL-1  -0.038  -0.653  0.514  -0.047  -0.865 0.388 0.018 0.160 0.873 
∆OPEN-1  0.053 1.804 0.073 0.053  1.880  0.062 -0.148 -2.390  0.019 
∆PART-1  1.403 4.573 0.000 1.273  3.696  0.000  0.842  2.477  0.015 
LEFT -0.126  -0.253  0.800  0.051  0.100  0.921  -0.797  -1.886  0.062 
∆UN-1 -2.081  -8.147  0.000  -2.226  -8.574  0.000  -1.836  -5.960  0.000 
MAAS-1  0.413 0.875 0.383 0.513  1.119  0.265  0.679  0.976  0.332 
No. Obs  211       211       129      
DW statistic  1.964      1.987     2.179     
R2  0.243       0.240       0.293      
 
In the regressions including Quinn’s 14-point index and the agglomeration interaction term, the 
parameter estimate of Quinn14 turn negative and significant, while the parameter estimate of the 
interaction term are significantly positive, as predicted by hypothesis 5. The parameter estimate is 
robust to changes in the sample countries and to changes in the included control variables (see  
Table   0-45 and Table   0-46). These observations imply that the significantly positive parameter 
estimates of Quinn14 in the previous regressions may be due to an omitted variables bias, in that 
Quinn￿s 14-point index may be capturing agglomeration effects. 




The interaction term between the agglomeration index and the capital mobility index is not 
significant when the CIP and the FDI stock are used. Moreover, when including the interaction 
term, most of the parameter estimates of the capital mobility indices change sign, size and 
substantially change their significance, implying that the included interaction term is rather 
collinear with the capital mobility term. Calculating the correlation coefficients between the 
interaction term and the capital mobility index for the three indices shows that this is in fact the 
case: The correlation coefficient for the CIP and the corresponding interaction term is 0.92, while 
it is 0.94 for the FDI index and 0.58 when Quinn14 is used. The agglomeration index of EU 
countries does not contain sufficient time variation
67. 
 
In brief, there is evidence that agglomeration economies provide a mitigating effect to pressures 
of capital mobility on capital income taxation in the European Union. More research is needed in 
order to solve the multicollinearity problem, however
68. 
 
Conclusions of the empirical analysis 
Table   0-12 summarizes the results of the empirical analysis. Results, which are not robust to 
changes in the sample countries or control variables, are in italics. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Hypothesis one is confirmed when CIP is used as a measure of capital mobility, 
while no significant correlations between the other two measures of capital mobility and primary 
expenditures were found. But the parameter estimate of the CIP is very small and not robust. 
Hence, the data does not robustly support hypothesis one. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Hypothesis 2 is not straightforward to conclude on, as the Quinn14 measure and 
the CIP measure give opposite results. In line with the previous literature, the Quinn14 measure is 
found to be either significantly positively explaining the variation in capital taxation, or to be 
insignificant. The test of hypothesis 5 gives a possible explanation for the positive correlation 
between Quinn14 and tax rates: the Quinn14 measure is likely to capture agglomeration effects. 
If this is the case, then the significantly negative parameter estimate of the CIP measure provides 
robust evidence in favor of a ￿race to the bottom￿ effect of capital mobility if agglomeration 
effects are disregarded. The implied capital mobility induced fall in tax rates since the early 
1980s is a 22.5 percent fall in corporate tax revenues in percent of GDP and a 12.6 percent 
relative fall in the EU average implicit capital tax. 
 
Hypothesis 3: The results of the test of hypothesis 3 show the same pattern as that of hypothesis 
2: If Quinn’s 14 point index is used as a measure of the degree of capital mobility, the correlation 
                                                    
67 Most of the variation in AGGLOM, like in SIZE, derives from the cross-country variation, which is cancelled out 
by the fixed effects. In order to take advantage of the cross section variation, an alternative approach is attempted, 
and the sample of countries is split into two sub samples, tentatively called ￿North￿ and ￿South￿, comprising, 
respectively, less agglomerated countries and more agglomerated countries. The samples are based on the same 
criteria as the agglomeration index, and thus, the ￿South￿ comprises Greece, Portugal, Spain and Ireland, while the 
￿North￿ comprises Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden. Since Italy 
and the United Kingdom are in between, they are left out of the groups. However, this test does not either lead to 
significant expected signs of the parameter estimates. 
68 Including the index of country size or agglomeration directly in the regressions does not change the parameter 
estimate qualitatively. Only in the regression of the implicit capital tax rate on Quinn14 and the interaction term of 
Quinn14 and SIZE does the inclusion of SIZE alone increase the standard errors so much that the parameter 




between capital mobility and corporate tax revenues in percent of total tax revenues is found to 
be positive. However, this may be explained by Quinn14 measure capturing agglomeration 
effects. At the same time, the CIP measure has the predicted sign and is significant. According to 
the estimate, and if agglomeration effects are disregarded, increasing capital mobility lead to a 20 
percent decrease in corporate tax revenues to total tax revenues, and a fall in the capital to labor 
implicit tax rate of 18 percentage points, corresponding to 9.5 percent of the implicit capital to 
labor tax ratio since the early 1980s.   
 








H1: EXPGDP  Icap  0.01 -0.04  -0.28
*** 









*** -0.02  -0.26
*** 






H4: CORPGDP  SIZE* 
Icap  0.003
* 0.001  0.005 
Icap -0.65
**  0.18  -1.54
* 





*** -0.05  -0.07 
H5: IMPLCAP  AGGLOM* 
Icap  0.09
*** 0.005  -0.07 
 
 
Hypothesis 4: Concerning hypothesis 4, there was some support for larger countries to 
experience a weaker downward pressure of capital mobility on their implicit capital tax rates. 
However, parameter estimate was not robust to changes in the sample countries, and no clear 
conclusions can be drawn. 
 
Hypothesis 5: Support for hypothesis 5, that agglomeration rents mitigate tax competition 
pressures, was found, but due to problems of multicollinearity, more research has to be done to 
establish this result more robustly. It is, however, very interesting that in the regression for which 
multicollinarity problems were smallest, namely in the regression using Quinn14, a clear 
acceptance of the agglomeration hypothesis was found. What is more, this result suggests that the 
widespread finding of positive correlations between Quinn14 and capital taxation in the previous 
empirical literature may have been due to omitted variables bias. 
 
7. Conclusions 
The use of the concept of a race to the bottom in capital taxation in the European Union is 
widespread, and this is irrespective of the fact that no robust empirical support for such tax 




contesting theories to the ￿race to the bottom￿, and what should be expected as a consequence of 
increasing capital mobility depends on the characteristics of the EU economies. Whether a race to 
the bottom in capital tax rates is taking place in the European Union is hence an empirical 
question. 
 
As the review of the empirical literature of Section   3 has shown, no previous support has been 
found for a direct downward pressure of capital mobility on tax rates. Several studies have even 
come to the opposite conclusion that capital mobility, measured by a popular measure of capital 
mobility, Quinn￿s 14-point index of financial liberalization, is positively correlated with capital 
taxation. However, the previous empirical literature does not test the extended predictions of the 
tax competition literature. Moreover, the empirical literature on tax competition only analyses 
rather heterogeneous panels of OECD countries, and no studies test the sensitivity of their results 
to the sample countries included. There are no regression studies only focusing on the potentially 
more homogenous EU data. 
 
This paper has provided such an investigation by testing the five tax competition hypotheses 
derived from the theoretical literature for a panel of EU countries. To this effect, three measures 
of capital mobility and two measures of the tax burden on capital have been derived and a panel 
regression analysis linking the measures of tax burdens and capital mobility has been carried out.  
 
Several conclusions can be drawn from the empirical analysis. One conclusion, concerning the 
effects of capital mobility on capital taxation, is that the choice of measure of capital mobility 
matters more than it should for the results. Using Quinn￿s 14 point index in general led to results 
opposite to what is predicted by standard tax competition theory, while using covered interest 
parity differentials often led to predicted parameter estimates. Parameter estimates for FDI stock 
measures did not exhibit a pattern and were often not significant or robust. The FDI measure was 
in advance deemed less appropriate as a measure of capital mobility, but a priori, none of the two 
former measures are better than the other, which complicates drawing conclusions.  
 
The regressions showed that the omission of agglomeration effects from the capital tax regression 
may be a potential explanation of the positive correlation between Quinn￿s 14-point index and 
capital taxation found here and in the previous literature. When agglomeration effects were 
included, the parameter estimate of Quinn￿s 14-point index became significantly negative, as 
predicted by standard tax competition theory, while the agglomeration term was positive, lending 
support to the predictions of the new economic geography literature that agglomeration rents are 
taxable and allow non-distortionary taxation within certain limits. However, the inclusion of the 
agglomeration term was accompanied by a substantial rise in multicollinearity, making more 
robust estimates of the agglomeration effect difficult. More research is definitely warranted. 
 
Furthermore, if the parameter estimates of Quinn￿s 14 point index indeed have suffered from 
omitted variables bias, then the results of the regressions using covered interest parity 
differentials as measure of capital mobility lend robust support to the standard tax competition 
hypotheses, disregarding potential agglomeration effects. Capital taxation in absolute terms and 
relative to labor taxation were both found to be negatively correlated with capital mobility. More 
specifically, an estimated 22.5 percent fall in corporate tax revenues in percent of GDP and a 12.6 
percent relative fall in the EU average implicit capital tax since the early 1980s were found to be 




percent decrease in corporate tax revenues in percent of total tax revenues, and a fall in the 
capital to labor implicit tax rate of 9.5 percent since the early 1980s. However, these conclusions 
are based on disregarding agglomeration effects, while at the same time basing the choice of 
capital mobility measure on agglomeration effects being correlated with Quinn￿s 14 point 
measure, which is clearly not consistent. More research into the importance of agglomeration 
effects on capital taxation is needed in order to identify whether these provide a significant 
counterweight to the estimated downward pressure on capital taxes.  
 
The hypothesis that tax competition leads to under-provision of the public good, and the 
hypothesis that the size of a country matters for the outcome of the tax competition game were 
not concluded on for lack of fit of the regressions and data problems.  
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Table   0-13: Definitions and sources of data used in the panel regression analysis  
Variable  Definition and Sources 
EXPGDP  Primary expenditures in percent of GDP. Source: OECD Economic Outlook 
CORPGDP  Corporate tax revenues in percent of GDP. Source: OECD Economic Outlook 
IMPLCAP  Implicit tax rate on capital calculated according to Carey and Thilinguirian 2000 on the 
basic of OECD revenue statistics. Source: Carey and Thilinguirian 2000 
CORPTOTALTAX  Corporate tax revenues in percent of total tax revenues. Source: OECD Economic 
Outlook 
TOTALTAX  Total tax revenues in percent of GDP. Source: OECD Economic Outlook 
CAPLAB  The average effective tax rate on capital in percent of the average effective capital 
income tax. Source: Carey and Thilinguirian 2000. 
CIP  Calculated as laid out in  Chapter two. The data is from Datastream and OECD Main 
Economic Indicators. 
SIZE  GDP relative to sum of GDP of countries included in the sample (EU13). Source: OECD 
Economic Outlook 
AGGLOM  Real GDP per capita. Source: OECD Economic Outlook 
GR  Real growth rate, calculated using data on nominal GDP and the GDP deflator. Source: 
OECD Economic Outlook 
INFL  The yearly percentage change in the consumer price index. Source: OECD Economic 
Outlook 
OPEN  The sum of exports and imports divided by 1.000.000*GDP (all in current local 
currency). Source: OECD Economic Outlook 
UN  Unemployment rate, percent. Source: OECD Economic Outlook 
PART  The participation rate, constructed as the labor force in percent of the population 
between the age of 15 and 65. Data for Portugal are from the Ameco database. 
Otherwise, the source is OECD Economic Outlook. 
MAAS  Dummy for the Maastricht years, taking the value 1 from 1993 onwards. 
EYEAR  Dummy taking the value 1 in years of parliamentary elections of the given country, and 
zero otherwise. Source: Parties and Elections in Europe: http://www.parties-and-
elections.de/ 
LEFT  Dummy for the ideology of the government in power. Construction as explained below. 
Source: Woldendorp, Keman and Budge (2000) 
IR  Short term Interest Rate, percent. Source: OECD Economic Outlook 




Descriptive statistics and unit root test statistics for all data series, sample: 1970-2001 
Table   0-14: Descriptive statistics and result of unit root tests for individual country specific series  
   Descriptive Statistics 
Augmented Dicky Fuller Unit Root Tests (with a constant and 
a trend but no lagged first differences) 




















Austria 18  45.37  5.37 -7.24 -3.73  Rejected  -6.29  -3.76  Rejected 
Belgium 18  47.42  3.96  -1.11 -3.73  NR  -3.17  -3.76  NR 
Germany 18  40.77  5.88  -2.66  -3.73  NR  -4.17  -3.76  Rejected 
Denmark 9  75.17  14.63 -5.07 -4.35 Rejected -1.78  -4.58  NR 
Spain 18  29.15  4.39  -1.15  -3.73  NR  -2.20  -3.76 NR 
Finland 18  45.43  19.31 -2.71 -3.73  NR  -3.76  -3.76  Rejected 
France 18  45.12  5.84 -1.07  -3.73  NR  -4.47  -3.76  Rejected 
Greece 9  38.66  6.18  -2.05  -4.35  NR  -1.62  -4.58 NR 
Ireland 18  39.46  21.29  -6.12 -3.73  Rejected  -4.19  -3.76  Rejected 
Italy 18  42.45  7.16  -3.08  -3.73 NR -3.31  -3.76  NR 
Netherlands 18  39.68 4.42  -3.29  -3.73  NR  -3.43  -3.76  NR 
Portugal 9  20.80  2.83 -4.78 -4.35  Rejected  -2.25  -4.58 NR 
Sweden 18  65.84  13.59 -1.83 -3.73  NR  -3.09  -3.76  NR 
IMPLCAP: 
Implicit  
tax rate  
on capital 
UK 18  83.57  15.09  -2.32  -3.73 NR -2.79  -3.76  NR 
Austria 18  1.26  0.20 -5.03 -3.73  Rejected  -5.71  -3.76  Rejected 
Belgium 18  1.21  0.12  -1.60 -3.73  NR  -2.69  -3.76  NR 
Germany 18  1.18  0.21  -2.50  -3.73  NR  -4.47  -3.76  Rejected 
Denmark 9  1.80  0.40 -4.24 -4.35  NR  -1.82  -4.58  NR 
Spain 18  1.06  0.09  -1.71  -3.73  NR  -2.79  -3.76 NR 
Finland 18  1.18  0.47 -2.76 -3.73  NR  -3.70  -3.76  NR 
France 18  1.19  0.23 -1.04  -3.73  NR  -5.88  -3.76  Rejected 
Greece 9  1.73  0.29  -1.90  -4.35  NR  -1.33  -4.58 NR 
Ireland 18  1.78  1.28  -12.59  -3.73  NR  -5.80  -3.76  Rejected 
Italy 18  1.34  0.13  -2.85  -3.73 NR -2.58  -3.76  NR 
Netherlands 18 0.96 0.13  -2.93  -3.73  NR  -3.26  -3.76  NR 
Portugal 9  0.93  0.10 -6.51 -4.35  Rejected  -3.73  -4.58 NR 
Sweden 18  1.35  0.24 -1.81 -3.73  NR  -3.41  -3.76  NR 
CAPLAB: 
Implicit tax 
rate on  
capital  
divided by  
the implicit  
tax rate  
on labor 
UK 18  3.71  0.53  -2.17  -3.73 NR -2.37  -3.76  NR 
Austria 31  1.51  0.26 -2.61 -3.57  NR  -6.15  -3.58  Rejected 
Belgium 31  2.70  0.46  -1.27 -3.57  NR  -3.30  -3.58  NR 
Germany 31  1.76  0.30  -2.83  -3.57  NR  -4.81  -3.58  Rejected 
Denmark 31  1.79  0.61  -2.45  -3.57  NR  -3.20  -3.58  NR 
Spain 31  1.77  0.62  -2.15  -3.57  NR  -2.57  -3.58 NR 
Finland 31  1.86  1.10 -0.65 -3.57  NR  -3.62  -3.58  Rejected 
France 31  2.19  0.31 -1.28  -3.57  NR  -4.69  -3.58  Rejected 
Greece 31  1.33  0.90 2.28 -3.57  NR  -2.62  -3.58 NR 
Ireland 31  2.01  0.85 -1.08 -3.57  NR  -4.34  -3.58  Rejected 
Italy 31  2.96  0.90  0.09  -3.57 NR -4.40  -3.58  Rejected 
Netherlands 31 3.13 0.56  -2.69  -3.57  NR  -4.16  -3.58 Rejected 
Portugal 12  2.91  0.89  -6.13 -3.99 Rejected -3.48  -4.08  NR 




revenues in  
percent of  
GDP 
UK 31  3.32  0.82  -2.62  -3.57 NR -4.39  -3.58  Rejected 




Table   0-14 continued: Descriptive statistics and result of unit root tests for individual country specific series 
   Descriptive Statistics 
Augmented Dicky Fuller Unit Root Tests (with a constant and 
a trend but no lagged first differences) 




















Austria 31  3.75  0.54 -2.47 -3.57  NR  -5.99  -3.58  Rejected 
Belgium 31  6.36  1.09  -1.10 -3.57  NR  -3.33  -3.58  NR 
Germany 31  4.84  0.83  -2.74  -3.57  NR  -4.55  -3.58  Rejected 
Denmark 31  3.83  1.07  -2.52  -3.57  NR  -3.37  -3.58  NR 
Spain 31  6.55  1.36  -1.92  -3.57  NR  -2.74  -3.58 NR 
Finland 31  4.52  2.21 -0.60 -3.57  NR  -3.49  -3.58  NR 
France 31  5.36  0.77 -1.26  -3.57  NR  -5.08  -3.58  Rejected 
Greece 31  4.55  2.15 0.42 -3.57  NR  -3.30  -3.58 NR 
Ireland 31  6.22  2.66 -0.75 -3.57  NR  -4.46  -3.58  Rejected 
Italy 31  8.40  1.45  -0.24  -3.57 NR -4.81  -3.58  Rejected 
Netherlands 31 7.43 1.32  -2.13  -3.57  NR  -4.03  -3.58 Rejected 
Portugal 12  8.95  2.28 -16.25 -3.99  NR  -8.11  -4.08  Rejected 






in percent of  
total tax 
revenues 
UK 31  9.26  2.02  -2.94  -3.57 NR -4.64  -3.58  Rejected 
Austria 28  7.75  2.69 1.54 -3.59  NR  -4.09  -3.60  Rejected 
Belgium 28  28.20  19.18 0.45  -3.59  NR  -3.07  -3.60  NR 
Germany 28  9.88  2.74  -1.98  -3.59  NR  -3.77  -3.60  Rejected 
Denmark 28  10.42  6.14  0.17  -3.59  NR  -5.03  -3.60  Rejected 
Spain 28  11.92  7.30  -1.62  -3.59  NR  -6.01  -3.60  Rejected 
Finland 28  8.63  8.01 -0.29 -3.59  NR  -7.02  -3.60  Rejected 
France 28  14.04  8.33 -0.11  -3.59  NR  -4.57  -3.60  Rejected 
Greece 28  9.76  4.36 -0.48  -3.59  NR  -2.57  -3.60 NR 
Ireland 28  12.29  4.72 -1.90 -3.59  NR  -4.09  -3.60  Rejected 
Italy 28  7.04  2.18  -1.10  -3.59 NR -3.99  -3.60  Rejected 
Netherlands 28  60.62  13.94  -1.95  -3.59  NR  -4.94  -3.60 Rejected 
Portugal 26  9.31  6.65  -1.51 -3.61  NR  -3.85  -3.62  Rejected 
Sweden 28  20.40  17.58 -0.42 -3.59  NR  -4.89  -3.60  Rejected 
FDI Stock  
in percent 
of GDP 
UK 28  17.90  9.72  1.28  -3.59 NR -1.23  -3.60  NR 
Austria 28  11.50  1.05 -2.41 -3.59  NR  -3.94  -3.60  Rejected 
Belgium 28  11.07  1.81  -1.88 -3.59  NR  -3.47  -3.60  NR 
Germany 28  13.93  0.18  -3.25  -3.59  NR  -3.90  -3.60  Rejected 
Denmark 28  11.27  2.07  -2.17  -3.59  NR  -4.21  -3.60  Rejected 
Spain 28  8.86  3.20  -2.65  -3.59  NR  -3.43  -3.60 NR 
Finland 28  10.84  1.77 -2.50 -3.59  NR  -4.08  -3.60  Rejected 
France 28  11.41  0.99 -1.77  -3.59  NR  -3.35  -3.60 NR 
Greece 28  7.18  2.63 -2.13  -3.59  NR  -3.58  -3.60 NR 
Ireland 28  10.75  1.88 0.04 -3.59  NR  -4.20  -3.60  Rejected 
Italy 28  11.48  1.54  -1.58  -3.59 NR -3.18  -3.60  NR 
Netherlands 28  13.21 0.92  -1.21  -3.59  NR  -3.87  -3.60 Rejected 
Portugal 28  7.75  3.60  -1.67 -3.59  NR  -3.59  -3.60  NR 
Sweden 28  11.32  1.15 -2.34 -3.59  NR  -3.47  -3.60  NR 
Quinn’14: 
Quinn￿s 14  
point index  
of financial  
liberalization 
UK 28  12.23  2.63  -1.40  -3.59 NR -3.24  -3.60  NR 




Table   0-14 continued: Descriptive statistics and result of unit root tests for individual country specific series 
   Descriptive Statistics 
Augmented Dicky Fuller Unit Root Tests (with a constant and 
a trend but no lagged first differences) 




















Austria 15  0.00  0.00 -6.79 -3.83  Rejected  -3.33  -3.87  NR 
Belgium 21  0.01  0.01  -0.61 -3.67  NR  -3.05  -3.69  NR 
Germany 32  0.00  0.00                 
Denmark 15  0.01  0.01  -3.68  -3.83  NR  -3.63  -3.87  NR 
Spain 25  0.03  0.02  -4.40  -3.62  Rejected  -5.25  -3.63  Rejected 
Finland 6  0.00  0.00                 
France 19  0.01  0.01 -2.01  -3.71  NR  -3.80  -3.73  Rejected 
Greece 6  0.03  0.03                 
Ireland 12  0.01  0.00 -1.86 -3.99  NR  -2.14  -4.08 NR 
Italy 24  0.03  0.02  -3.43  -3.63 NR -2.84  -3.65  NR 
Netherlands 17 0.00 0.00  -5.88  -3.79  Rejected  -3.29  -3.83  NR 
Portugal 10  0.02  0.01                 
Sweden 18  0.02  0.01 -3.18 -3.73  NR  -3.28  -3.76  NR 






UK 17  0.02  0.01  -2.24  -3.76 NR -2.45  -3.79  NR 
Austria 169  0.00  0.00  -4.91 -3.44 Rejected  -11.75  -3.44  NR 
Belgium 246  0.01  0.01  -4.61  -3.43 Rejected -13.02  -3.43  NR 
Germany 378  0.00  0.00                 
Denmark 174  0.01 0.01  -3.45  -3.44  Rejected  -8.96 -3.44 Rejected 
Spain 294  0.03  0.02 -5.54  -3.43  Rejected  -14.49  -3.43 NR 
Finland 55  0.00  0.00 -3.75 -3.50  Rejected  -7.31  -3.50  Rejected 
France 213  0.01  0.01 -4.29 -3.43 Rejected  -11.25  -3.43  NR 
Greece 55  0.02  0.03 -1.86  -3.50  NR  -5.62  -3.50  Rejected 
Ireland 127  0.01  0.01 -3.03 -3.45  NR  -9.28  -3.45  Rejected 
Italy 273  0.03  0.02  -3.78  -3.43  Rejected  -10.92  -3.43 NR 
Netherlands 198 0.00  0.00  -3.66  -3.43  Rejected  -12.45  -3.43  NR 
Portugal 114  0.02  0.01  -4.01  -3.45 Rejected -9.58 -3.45  Rejected 








UK 198  0.02  0.01  -2.16  -3.43  NR -11.70  -3.43  NR 
Austria 30  2.97  1.24 0.68 -3.58  NR  -3.74  -3.59  Rejected 
Belgium 30  7.88  2.91  -0.10 -3.58  NR  -3.18  -3.59  NR 
Germany 30  2.44  0.93  -2.75  -3.58  NR  -3.60  -3.59  Rejected 
Denmark 12  6.51  0.92  0.00  -3.99  NR  -3.70  -4.08  NR 
Spain 32  2.33  1.92  -1.57  -3.57  NR  -3.47  -3.57 NR 
Finland 30  1.90  1.30 -2.54 -3.58  NR  -3.04  -3.59  NR 
France 30  2.30  1.07 -1.69  -3.58  NR  -2.16  -3.59 NR 
Greece 30  5.28  3.60 -1.48  -3.65  NR  -2.90  -3.66 NR 
Ireland 23  6.91  2.04 -1.13 -3.58  NR  -2.09  -3.59 NR 
Italy 30  6.84  3.23  0.29  -3.58 NR -2.51  -3.59  NR 
Netherlands 30 4.77 1.37  -0.59  -3.58  NR  -2.27  -3.59  NR 
Portugal 32  4.15  2.66  -0.63 -3.57  NR  -3.57  -3.57  Rejected 





in percent of 
GDP 




Table   0-14 continued: Descriptive statistics and result of unit root tests for individual country specific series  
   Descriptive Statistics 
Augmented Dicky Fuller Unit Root Tests (with a constant and 
a trend but no lagged first differences) 




















Austria 3.60  1.31 12  -3.52  -3.59  NR  -5.55  -3.59  Rejected 
Belgium 0.55  1.21 29  -1.78  -3.59  NR  -5.48 -3.59 Rejected 
Germany 2.05  3.11  29  -3.10  -3.59  NR  -5.31 -3.59 Rejected 
Denmark 0.52  1.13  29  -2.38  -3.99  NR  -2.89 -4.08  NR 
Spain -1.29  1.61  26  -1.91 -3.61  NR  -3.61  -3.62  NR 
Finland 1.38  1.57 11  -3.24  -4.08  NR  -2.18 -4.20  NR 
France 0.16  1.62  23  -1.43 -3.65  NR  -3.94  -3.66  Rejected 
Greece -2.04  2.05 29  -1.66  -3.65  NR  -3.82 -3.66  Rejected 
Ireland -1.42  2.98 23  -2.10  -3.59  NR  -4.29 -3.59  Rejected 
Italy -1.03  4.35  29  -4.48 -3.59  Rejected  -5.93  -3.59  Rejected 
Netherlands 1.48 2.16  29  -1.40  -3.59  NR  -4.67  -3.59  Rejected 
Portugal -1.54  1.97  31  -2.60  -3.57  NR  -4.85 -3.58 Rejected 




of growth on 
public debt 
in percent of 
GDP 
UK -1.37  2.41  31 -1.77  -3.57  NR  -4.55  -3.58  Rejected 
Austria 45.87  17.88 32  -0.90  -3.56  NR  -3.62 -3.57 Rejected 
Belgium 100.3  29.33 32  -0.76  -3.56  NR  -1.90  -3.57  NR 
Germany 38.96  14.54  32  -2.33  -3.56  NR  -2.51  -3.57  NR 
Denmark 65.73  10.56  22  -2.38  -3.67  NR  -2.56  -3.67  NR 
Spain 47.94  21.59  26  -1.89 -3.61  NR  -2.03  -3.62  NR 
Finland 42.91  15.86 13  -2.76  -3.92  NR  -3.96 -3.99  NR 
France 45.06  13.32 25  -2.72  -3.62  NR  -1.74 -3.63  NR 
Greece 58.08  37.84 32  0.27  -3.59  NR  -2.72 -3.60  NR 
Ireland 76.85  22.01 28  -1.38  -3.56  NR  -2.17 -3.57  NR 
Italy 83.97  28.48  32  -0.52 -3.56  NR  -1.79  -3.57  NR 
Netherlands 59.37  14.42  32  -0.73  -3.56  NR  -1.70  -3.57  NR 
Portugal 44.29  17.37 32  -0.59  -3.56  NR  -3.89  -3.57 Rejected 





UK 57.78  7.68  32  -2.64  -3.56  NR  -2.65  -3.57 NR 
NR: Not rejected 
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  Robustness Tests of the Basic Specification 
 
Table   0-15: The basic regressions including all available observations. Max. sample: 1972-200  
Dependent 
Variable 
A. Primary expenditures in % 
of GDP (b) 
B. Corporate tax revenues in 
percent of GDP (c.) 
C. Corporate tax revenues in 






estimate  t-stat p-value 
Para- 
meter 
estimate  t-stat p-value 
Para- 
meter 
estimate  t-stat p-value 
GR-1  -0.05  -1.44 0.15 0.02 3.84 0.00 0.06 3.86 0.00 
INFL-1  0.08 4.04 0.00 0.00  -0.96 0.34  -0.02  -2.19 0.03 
∆OPEN-1  0.02 2.61 0.01 0.00  -1.05 0.30 0.00  -0.24 0.81 
∆PART-1  0.01 0.17 0.86 0.02 1.07 0.29 0.01 0.14 0.89 
LEFT  -0.32 -2.29  0.02 -0.08 -2.38  0.02 -0.20 -2.52  0.01 
∆UN-1  -0.10 -1.38  0.17 -0.03 -2.54  0.01 -0.08 -2.23  0.03 
MAAS-1  -1.22  -4.66 0.00 0.26 6.84 0.00 0.65 6.91 0.00 
No. Obs  313.00       338.00       338.00      
DW  statistic  2.20     2.06       2.02    
R2  0.12       0.14       0.15     
 
  Robustness Tests for Hypothesis 1 
Table   0-16: Robustness of the parameter estimates of the capital mobility index in the primary expenditures to GDP 
regression of dropping countries from the sample 
Excluding 








AT 0.030  0.449  -0.045  -1.537  -0.370  -3.181 
BE  -0.119 -1.519 -0.045 -1.502 -0.273 -2.953 
DE 0.003  0.038  -0.020  -0.650  -0.274  -2.803 
DK 0.059  0.867  -0.036  -1.226  -0.236  -1.883 
FI 0.044  0.608  -0.029  -0.929  -0.282  -2.888 
FR  -0.021 -0.281 -0.019 -0.659 -0.243 -2.477 
GR  -0.063 -0.970 -0.030 -1.093 -0.282 -2.888 
IE  -0.010 -0.144 -0.025 -0.829 -0.297 -2.466 
IT 0.095  1.397  -0.021  -0.696  -0.109  -1.035 
NL 0.014  0.213  -0.045  -1.145  -0.319  -2.901 
SE 0.031  0.423  -0.027  -0.862  -0.406  -3.366 
UK 0.010  0.152  -0.040  -1.375  -0.376  -3.418 
ES 0.107  1.330  -0.038  -1.257  -0.359  -2.956 
PT  -0.050 -0.604 -0.008 -0.235 -0.265 -2.748 





Table   0-17: Robustness of the parameter estimates of the capital mobility index in the primary expenditures to GDP 
regression to including interest rates and election year dummies in as regressors 
   Quinn 14  FDI Stocks  -CIP 
  
Parameter 
estimate t-stat p-value 
Parameter 
estimate t-stat  p-value 
Parameter 
estimate t-stat  p-value 
∆Icap-1 0.086  1.186  0.237  -0.039  -1.271  0.205  0.242  1.559  0.122 
GR-1 -0.061  -1.591  0.113  -0.062  -1.670  0.096  -0.146  -3.097  0.003 
INFL-1 0.014  0.677  0.499  0.013  0.619  0.537  0.102  3.344  0.001 
∆OPEN-1 0.021  2.826  0.005  0.020  2.691  0.008  -0.027  -2.589  0.011 
∆PART-1 0.000  -0.004  0.997  -0.005  -0.065  0.949  0.313  3.180  0.002 
LEFT -0.107  -0.984  0.326  -0.101  -0.891  0.374  -0.484  -2.900  0.005 
∆UN-1 -0.028  -0.355  0.723  -0.031  -0.403  0.688  0.099  1.106  0.271 
MAAS-1 -1.041  -4.866  0.000  -1.056  -5.105  0.000  -0.274  -1.149  0.253 
∆IR-1 0.158  4.455  0.000  0.149  4.279  0.000  0.297  5.233  0.000 
ELEC+1 -0.062  -0.637  0.525  -0.084  -0.840  0.402  -0.323  -2.463  0.015 
ELEC -0.076  -0.763 0.446  -0.054 -0.541 0.589  -0.268  -1.950  0.054 
 
Table   0-18: Robustness of the parameter estimates of the capital mobility index in the primary expenditures to GDP 
regression to including growth and inflation in first differences 
   Quinn 14  FDI Stocks  -CIP 
  
Parameter 
estimate  t-stat p-value 
parameter 
estimate  t-stat p-value 
parameter 
estimate  t-stat p-value 
∆Icap-1  0.058 0.966 0.335 -0.010 -0.382 0.703 -0.258 -3.279 0.001 
∆GR-1  -0.169 -8.675 0.000 -0.167 -8.675 0.000 -0.126 -7.037 0.000 
∆INFL-1  -0.009 -0.391 0.696 -0.016 -0.701 0.484 0.152 3.423 0.001 
∆OPEN-1  0.017 2.221 0.027 0.016 2.215 0.028 -0.034  -4.488 0.000 
∆PART-1  -0.027 -0.484 0.629 -0.022 -0.380 0.704 0.246 2.958 0.004 
LEFT  -0.081 -0.693 0.489 -0.058 -0.501 0.617 -0.556 -3.414 0.001 
∆UN-1  -0.035 -0.578 0.564 -0.033 -0.567 0.572 0.195 3.244 0.002 
MAAS-1  -1.251 -7.029 0.000 -1.278 -7.189 0.000 -0.959 -6.507 0.000 





  Robustness Tests for Hypothesis 2 
Table   0-19: Robustness of the parameter estimates of the capital mobility index in the corporate revenue to GDP 
regression of dropping countries from the sample 
Excluding 
country:  Quinn 14  FDI Stocks  -CIP 
  
Parameter 
Estimate  t-stat 
Parameter 
estimate  t-stat 
Parameter 
Estimate  t-stat 
AT  0.071  3.660 -0.008 -1.362 -0.101 -2.852 
BE  0.069  3.346 -0.007 -1.040 -0.126 -3.384 
DE  0.068  3.581 -0.008 -1.345 -0.098 -2.814 
DK  0.068  3.398 -0.005 -0.822 -0.087 -2.413 
FI  0.064  3.269 -0.011 -1.757 -0.101 -2.889 
FR  0.075  3.699 -0.005 -0.796 -0.121 -3.180 
GR  0.072  3.399 -0.008 -1.306 -0.101 -2.889 
IE  0.070  3.382 -0.007 -1.354 -0.093 -2.694 
IT  0.071  3.691 -0.010 -1.806 -0.131 -3.232 
NL  0.067  3.529 -0.007 -0.874 -0.107 -3.033 
SE  0.065  3.413 -0.003 -0.512 -0.064 -1.718 
UK  0.043  2.136 -0.011 -1.874 -0.079 -2.147 
ES  0.057  2.696 -0.006 -0.990 -0.114 -3.056 
PT  0.077  4.130 -0.009 -1.661 -0.010 -2.625 
 
Table   0-20:  Robustness of the parameter estimates of the capital mobility index in the implicit capital tax regression 
of dropping countries from the sample 
Excluding 








AT -0.171  -0.625  0.094  1.012  -1.590  -3.374 
BE -0.087  -0.237  0.041  0.404  -1.696  -3.598 
DE -0.138  -0.467  0.066  0.693  -1.580  -3.417 
DK  0.384 1.398 0.066 0.694 -1.222 -2.943 
FI  -0.430 -1.815 -0.025 -0.287  -1.677  -3.748 
FR -0.278  -0.841  0.095  0.971  -2.162  -4.172 
GR -0.019  -0.066  0.071  0.770  -1.677  -3.748 
IE -0.418  -1.324  0.002  0.017  -1.505  -3.186 
IT -0.274  -0.987  0.101  1.047  -1.440  -2.872 
NL  -0.201 -0.718 -0.075 -0.581  -1.559  -3.318 
SE -0.091  -0.316  0.077  0.807  -1.583  -3.053 
UK -0.283  -1.052  0.051  0.534  -1.421  -3.034 
ES -0.268  -0.885  0.084  0.851  -1.699  -3.391 
PT  0.244 0.769 0.085 0.858 -1.639 -3.436 





Table   0-21: Robustness of the parameter estimates of the capital mobility index in the corporate tax revenues in 
percent of GDP regression to including interest rates and election year dummies in as regressors 
   Quinn 14  FDI Stocks  -CIP 
  
parameter 
estimate t-stat p-value 
parameter 
estimate t-stat p-value 
parameter 
estimate t-stat p-value 
∆Icap-1  0.048 2.663 0.008 -0.009 -1.532 0.127 -0.123 -2.942 0.004 
GR-1  0.003 0.725 0.469 0.003 0.731 0.465 0.006 0.665 0.507 
INFL-1  0.004 0.646 0.519 0.006 0.968 0.334 -0.026  -1.817 0.072 
∆OPEN-1  -0.003 -2.617 0.010 -0.003 -2.517 0.013 -0.014 -3.831 0.000 
∆PART-1  0.016 0.940 0.348 0.018 1.055 0.293 0.003 0.134 0.894 
LEFT  -0.108 -3.161 0.002 -0.102 -2.992 0.003 -0.130 -3.058 0.003 
∆UN-1  -0.066 -5.720 0.000 -0.065 -5.817 0.000 -0.048 -2.242 0.027 
MAAS-1  0.214 6.820 0.000 0.221 7.168 0.000 0.155 2.988 0.004 
∆IR-1  -0.009 -1.266 0.207 -0.009 -1.318 0.189 -0.009 -0.627 0.532 
ELEC+1  0.032 1.262 0.209 0.030 1.180 0.239 0.003 0.074 0.941 
ELEC  0.035 1.383 0.168 0.039 1.563 0.120 -0.023  -0.607 0.545 
 
 
Table   0-22: Robustness of the parameter estimates of the capital mobility index in the implicit tax rate on capital 
regression to including interest rates and election year dummies in as regressors 
   Quinn 14  FDI Stocks  -CIP 
  
parameter 
estimate t-stat p-value 
parameter 
estimate t-stat p-value 
parameter 
estimate t-stat p-value 
∆Icap-1  0.071 0.267 0.790 0.126 1.524 0.129 -1.451  -2.912 0.004 
GR-1  -0.451 -5.242 0.000 -0.463 -5.526 0.000 -0.234 -2.214 0.029 
INFL-1  -0.381 -3.035 0.003 -0.374 -3.071 0.003 -0.498 -3.043 0.003 
∆OPEN-1  0.018 0.635 0.526 0.016 0.576 0.565 -0.113  -1.902 0.060 
∆PART-1  1.333 4.772 0.000 1.344 4.872 0.000 1.387 4.094 0.000 
LEFT  0.214 0.419 0.676 0.185 0.367 0.714 -0.582  -1.155 0.251 
∆UN-1  -2.387  -11.203  0.000 -2.411  -11.531  0.000 -1.831 -6.829 0.000 
MAAS-1  1.530 3.737 0.000 1.376 3.407 0.001 0.946 1.731 0.086 
∆IR-1  0.352 3.271 0.001 0.335 3.228 0.002 0.343 1.962 0.052 
ELEC+1  0.390 1.030 0.304 0.462 1.260 0.209 0.727 1.751 0.083 
ELEC  -1.051 -2.840 0.005 -0.994 -2.780 0.006 -1.484 -3.569 0.001 





Table   0-23: Robustness of the parameter estimates of the capital mobility index in the corporate tax revenues to GDP 
regression to including growth and inflation in first differences 
   Quinn 14  FDI Stocks  -CIP 
  
parameter 
estimate t-stat p-value 
parameter 
estimate t-stat p-value 
parameter 
estimate t-stat p-value 
∆Icap-1  0.052 2.880 0.004 -0.008 -1.520 0.130 -0.106 -3.079 0.003 
∆GR-1  0.003 0.602 0.548 0.003 0.587 0.558 0.006 0.716 0.475 
∆INFL-1  0.001 0.100 0.920 0.002 0.432 0.666 -0.030  -2.180 0.031 
∆OPEN-1  -0.003 -2.453 0.015 -0.003 -2.380 0.018 -0.014 -4.280 0.000 
∆PART-1  0.012 0.723 0.470 0.012 0.754 0.452 0.004 0.161 0.873 
LEFT-1  -0.105 -3.246 0.001 -0.099 -3.031 0.003 -0.138 -3.413 0.001 
∆UN-1  -0.063 -5.593 0.000 -0.063 -5.763 0.000 -0.048 -2.353 0.020 
MAAS-1  0.234 7.955 0.000 0.241 8.153 0.000 0.175 3.857 0.000 
 
 
Table   0-24: Robustness of the parameter estimates of the capital mobility index in the implicit capital tax rate 
regression to including growth and inflation in first differences 
   Quinn 14  FDI Stocks  -CIP 
  
parameter 
estimate t-stat p-value 
parameter 
estimate t-stat p-value 
parameter 
estimate t-stat p-value 
∆Icap-1  0.184 0.696 0.487 0.147 1.638 0.103 -1.839  -4.319 0.000 
∆GR-1  -0.455 -5.320 0.000 -0.462 -5.564 0.000 -0.319 -3.084 0.003 
∆INFL-1  -0.129 -1.229 0.221 -0.121 -1.197 0.233 -0.437 -2.639 0.010 
∆OPEN-1  0.025 1.042 0.299 0.025 1.096 0.275 -0.133  -2.499 0.014 
∆PART-1  1.133 3.938 0.000 1.106 3.913 0.000 1.410 3.762 0.000 
LEFT  0.167 0.327 0.744 0.113 0.225 0.822 -0.934  -1.731 0.086 
∆UN-1  -2.498  -12.175  0.000 -2.496  -12.501  0.000 -2.209 -8.226 0.000 
MAAS-1  1.099 3.073 0.002 0.934 2.615 0.010 0.552 1.059 0.292 





Table   0-25: Robustness of the parameter estimates of the capital mobility index in the corporate tax revenues to GDP 
regression to including total tax revenues in percent of GDP (controling for the trend of taxes to grow other the 
sample period) 
   Quinn 14  FDI Stocks  -CIP 
  
parameter 
estimate  t-stat p-value 
parameter 
estimate  t-stat p-value 
parameter 
estimate  t-stat p-value 
∆Icap-1  0.044 3.067 0.002 -0.004 -0.985 0.326 -8.842 -2.650 0.009 
∆GR-1  0.011 2.812 0.005 0.011 2.842 0.005 0.010 1.281 0.203 
∆INFL-1  -0.002 -0.554 0.580 0.000 -0.047 0.963 -0.022 -1.633 0.105 
∆OPEN-1  -0.003 -2.840 0.005 -0.003 -2.730 0.007 -0.011 -3.578 0.001 
∆PART-1  -0.020 -1.554 0.122 -0.019 -1.498 0.136 -0.009 -0.374 0.709 
LEFT-1  -0.135 -4.744 0.000 -0.136 -4.688 0.000 -0.114 -2.826 0.006 
∆UN-1  -0.068 -8.109 0.000 -0.067 -7.793 0.000 -0.031 -1.513 0.133 
MAAS-1  0.223 11.807 0.000  0.222 11.452 0.000  0.159  3.687  0.000 
∆TOTALTAX  0.079 12.788 0.000  0.078 12.765 0.000  0.050  4.182  0.000 
 
Table   0-26: Robustness of the parameter estimates of the capital mobility index in the implicit capital tax rate 
regression to including total tax revenues in percent of GDP (controlling for the trend of taxes to grow other the 
sample period) 
   Quinn 14  FDI Stocks  -CIP 
  
parameter 
estimate  t-stat p-value 
parameter 
estimate  t-stat p-value 
parameter 
estimate  t-stat p-value 
∆Icap-1  0.663 3.409 0.001 0.144 1.868 0.063  -91.108  -3.457 0.001 
∆GR-1  -0.313 -5.039 0.000 -0.302 -4.526 0.000 -0.095 -1.190 0.237 
∆INFL-1  -0.220 -3.653 0.000 -0.215 -3.329 0.001 -0.044 -0.368 0.714 
∆OPEN-1  0.000 0.024 0.981 0.005 0.215 0.830 -0.056  -1.291 0.199 
∆PART-1  0.794 4.097 0.000 0.781 3.800 0.000 1.087 3.602 0.001 
∆LEFT-1  0.647 1.715 0.088 0.647 1.620 0.107 -0.675  -1.535 0.128 
∆UN-1  -2.459  -17.502  0.000 -2.463  -16.225  0.000 -1.659 -7.788 0.000 
MAAS-1  1.492 4.939 0.000 1.203 3.703 0.000 0.260 0.735 0.464 
∆TOTALTAX  2.158 27.097 0.000  2.163 24.686 0.000  1.843 12.205 0.000 





Table   0-27: Robustness of the parameter estimates of the capital mobility index in the corporate tax revenues to GDP 
regression to including income per capita 
   Quinn 14  FDI Stocks  -CIP 
  
parameter 
estimate t-stat p-value 
parameter 
estimate t-stat p-value 
parameter 
estimate t-stat p-value 
∆Icap-1  0.05 2.63 0.01 -0.02  -2.15 0.03 -0.10  -2.78 0.01 
∆income-1  -0.01  -0.83 0.40 -0.00  -0.05 0.95 0.01 0.47 0.63 
∆GR-1  0.02 2.41 0.02 0.03 2.70 0.01 0.03 1.91 0.05 
∆INFL-1  0.01 0.99 0.32 0.01 1.57 0.12 0.01 0.90 0.36 
∆OPEN-1  -0.01 -2.42 0.02 -0.01 -2.42 0.02 -0.01 -4.55 0.00 
∆PART-1  -0.02 -1.26 0.20 -0.03 -1.63 0.10 -0.03 -1.09 0.27 
LEFT-1  -0.08 -2.93 0.00 -0.08 -2.90 0.00 -0.09 -2.63 0.01 
∆UN-1  -0.03  -1.61 0.10 -0.03  -1.52 0.13 0.01 0.21 0.82 




Table   0-28: Using the corporate implicit tax rate (corporate tax revenues divided by the gross operating surplus) as 
dependent variable. Only 9 countries are included in the sample (Austria, Finland, Greece, Ireland and Portugal are 
excluded from the sample due to lack of data.) 
   Quinn 14  FDI Stocks  -CIP 
  
parameter 
estimate t-stat p-value 
parameter 
estimate t-stat p-value 
parameter 
estimate t-stat p-value 
∆Icap-1  0.593 3.581 0.001 -0.004 -0.090 0.928 -1.015 -3.025 0.003 
GR-1  0.172 1.756 0.081 0.208 2.010 0.046 -0.068  -0.435 0.665 
INFL-1  0.056 1.363 0.175 0.051 1.175 0.242 -0.112  -1.304 0.196 
∆OPEN-1  11.693 3.202  0.002 12.060 3.242  0.002 12.291 2.082  0.041 
∆PART-1  0.264 0.946 0.346 0.263 0.910 0.365 0.574 1.558 0.123 
∆LEFT  -1.074 -2.932 0.004 -1.188 -3.116 0.002 -1.256 -3.139 0.002 
∆UN-1  -0.612 -4.027 0.000 -0.569 -3.521 0.001 -0.711 -3.023 0.003 
MAAS-1  1.812 6.060 0.000 1.607 5.145 0.000 0.798 1.722 0.089 
No. Obs  158  158  96 
DW 1.845  0.204  1.892 
R2 0.211 1.827 0.239 





  Robustness Tests for Hypothesis 3 
Table   0-29: Robustness of the parameter estimates of the capital mobility index in the corporate revenue to total tax 
revenues of dropping countries from the sample 
Excluding 
country:  Quinn 14  FDI Stocks  -CIP 
   parameter estimate t-stat  parameter estimate t-stat  parameter estimate t-stat 
AT  0.165 3.504 -0.022 -1.756 -0.246 -2.930 
BE  0.160 3.137 -0.022 -1.959 -0.327 -3.702 
DE  0.150 3.075 -0.014 -1.088 -0.248 -3.013 
DK  0.149 3.336 -0.019 -1.906 -0.230 -2.643 
FI  0.105 2.212 -0.032 -2.716 -0.254 -3.118 
FR  0.131 2.733 -0.019 -1.699 -0.299 -3.437 
GR  0.193 3.890 -0.021 -1.880 -0.254 -3.118 
IE  0.148 2.985 -0.031 -2.891 -0.232 -2.800 
IT  0.152 3.120 -0.027 -2.654 -0.292 -3.250 
NL 0.152  3.251  0.003  0.183  -0.277  -3.376 
SE  0.128 2.748 -0.014 -1.142 -0.171 -1.842 
UK  0.167 3.535 -0.026 -2.336 -0.222 -2.629 
ES  0.114 2.287 -0.014 -1.195 -0.280 -3.394 
PT  0.196 4.415 -0.029 -2.654 -0.257 -3.002 
 
 
Table   0-30: Robustness of the parameter estimates of the capital mobility index in the implicit capital tax divided by 
the implicit labor income tax regression of dropping countries from the sample 
Excluding 
country:  Quinn 14  FDI Stocks  -CIP 
  
parameter 
estimate  t-stat 
parameter 
estimate  t-stat 
parameter 
estimate  t-stat 
AT  0.001 0.167 0.003 1.147  -0.043  -3.097 
BE  0.008 0.636 0.001 0.405  -0.044  -3.203 
DE 0.000  -0.034  0.002  1.060  -0.044  -3.152 
DK  0.009 1.118 0.002 0.985  -0.038  -2.989 
FI  -0.001 -0.192 -0.001 -0.641  -0.045 -3.398 
FR  -0.002 -0.189  0.003  1.140 -0.054 -3.740 
GR  0.006 0.790 0.003 1.432  -0.045  -3.398 
IE  -0.009 -0.988  0.001  0.535 -0.043 -3.068 
IT  0.002 0.243 0.002 0.884  -0.040  -2.303 
NL  -0.003 -0.421  0.001  0.271 -0.046 -3.312 
SE  -0.004 -0.491  0.002  0.693 -0.053 -3.567 
UK  -0.004 -0.475  0.001  0.321 -0.028 -2.453 
ES 0.000  -0.027  0.002  0.970  -0.043  -2.988 
PT  0.009 1.015 0.002 0.768  -0.045  -3.308 





Table   0-31: Robustness of the parameter estimates of the capital mobility index in the corporate tax revenues in 
percent of total tax revenues to including interest rates and election year dummies in as regressors 
   Quinn 14  FDI Stocks  -CIP 
  
paramete
r estimate  t-stat  p-value 
paramete
r estimate  t-stat  p-value 
paramete
r estimate  t-stat  p-value 
∆Icap-1  0.124 2.695 0.008 -0.022 -1.896 0.059 -0.362 -3.625 0.000 
GR-1  0.063 3.192 0.002 0.061 3.157 0.002 0.053 1.599 0.113 
INFL-1  0.009 0.954 0.341 0.007 0.902 0.368 0.001 0.038 0.970 
∆OPEN-1  -0.007 -1.958 0.052 -0.006 -1.749 0.082 -0.027 -3.817 0.000 
∆PART-1  -0.020 -0.429 0.669 -0.018 -0.391 0.696 -0.055 -0.912 0.364 
LEFT  -0.306 -3.643 0.000 -0.297 -3.585 0.000 -0.283 -2.619 0.010 
∆UN-1  -0.120 -3.238 0.001 -0.120 -3.251 0.001 -0.030 -0.433 0.666 
MAAS-1  0.649 8.042 0.000 0.670 8.623 0.000 0.274 2.066 0.041 
∆IR-1  -0.022 -1.334 0.184 -0.018 -1.151 0.251 -0.062 -1.863 0.065 
ELEC+1  0.037 0.580 0.563 0.039 0.610 0.543 -0.023  -0.247 0.805 
ELEC  0.124 1.950 0.053 0.148 2.351 0.020 -0.056  -0.581 0.562 
 
Table   0-32: Robustness of the parameter estimates of the capital mobility index in the implicit tax rate on capital 
divided by the implicit tax rate on labor regression to including interest rates and election year dummies in as 
regressors 
   Quinn 14  FDI Stocks  -CIP 
  
parameter 
estimate t-stat p-value 
parameter 
estimate t-stat p-value 
parameter 
estimate t-stat p-value 
∆Icap-1  -0.004  -0.472 0.637 0.002 0.854 0.394 -0.032  -1.951 0.054 
GR-1  0.004 0.894 0.373 0.003 0.765 0.445 -0.002  -0.278 0.781 
INFL-1  -0.013 -5.787 0.000 -0.013 -5.741 0.000 0.000 -0.038 0.970 
∆OPEN-1  0.003 2.122 0.035 0.003 2.047 0.042 -0.002  -1.076 0.284 
∆PART-1  0.014 1.715 0.088 0.016 1.844 0.067 0.033 2.837 0.006 
LEFT  0.005 0.320 0.750 0.004 0.312 0.755 -0.037  -2.379 0.019 
∆UN-1  -0.065 -7.938 0.000 -0.066 -8.141 0.000 -0.060 -6.048 0.000 
MAAS-1  0.009 0.552 0.582 0.008 0.482 0.631 0.017 0.957 0.341 
∆IR-1  0.007 1.719 0.087 0.007 1.689 0.093 0.008 1.515 0.133 
ELEC+1  -0.004 -0.386 0.700 -0.003 -0.263 0.793 -0.009 -0.680 0.498 
ELEC  -0.033 -3.204 0.002 -0.033 -3.330 0.001 -0.038 -3.077 0.003 





Table   0-33: Robustness of the parameter estimates of the capital mobility index in the corporate tax revenues to total 
tax revenues regression to including growth and inflation in levels 
   Quinn 14  FDI Stocks  -CIP 
  
paramete
r estimate  t-stat  p-value 
paramete
r estimate  t-stat  p-value 
paramete
r estimate  t-stat  p-value 
∆Icap -1  0.155 3.449 0.001 -0.021 -1.875 0.062 -0.258 -3.267 0.001 
GR-1  0.023 2.161 0.032 0.023 2.219 0.028 0.026 1.389 0.168 
INFL-1  0.003 0.197 0.844 0.006 0.493 0.623 -0.072  -2.182 0.031 
∆OPEN-1  -0.005 -1.479 0.141 -0.004 -1.234 0.219 -0.025 -3.483 0.001 
∆PART-1  -0.004 -0.097 0.923 -0.001 -0.032 0.974 -0.003 -0.046 0.964 
LEFT  -0.267 -3.541 0.001 -0.258 -3.395 0.001 -0.279 -2.861 0.005 
∆UN-1  -0.168 -6.060 0.000 -0.167 -5.983 0.000 -0.083 -1.730 0.086 
MAAS-1  0.603 9.250 0.000 0.620 9.202 0.000 0.383 3.730 0.000 
 
Table   0-34: Robustness of the parameter estimates of the capital mobility index in the implicit capital tax rate 
divided by the implicit labor tax rate regression to including growth and inflation in levels 
   Quinn 14  FDI Stocks  -CIP 
  
parameter 
estimate t-stat p-value 
parameter 
estimate t-stat p-value 
parameter 
estimate t-stat p-value 
∆Icap-1  0.013 1.557 0.121 0.003 1.466 0.144 -0.045  -3.710 0.000 
GR-1  -0.011 -4.498 0.000 -0.012 -4.765 0.000 -0.008 -2.558 0.012 
INFL-1  -0.010 -3.099 0.002 -0.010 -3.034 0.003 -0.005 -1.142 0.256 
∆OPEN-1  0.002 1.444 0.151 0.002 1.423 0.156 -0.003  -1.864 0.065 
∆PART-1  0.022 2.939 0.004 0.023 3.024 0.003 0.036 3.802 0.000 
LEFT  0.009 0.564 0.574 0.006 0.388 0.699 -0.044  -2.610 0.010 
∆UN-1  -0.092  -13.665  0.000 -0.092  -13.506  0.000 -0.069 -8.476 0.000 
MAAS-1  0.042 3.197 0.002 0.037 2.760 0.006 0.003 0.231 0.818 
 
 
Table   0-35: Using the corporate implicit tax rate in percent of the implicit tax rate on labor as explanatory variable. 
Austria, Finland, Greece, Ireland and Portugal are excluded from the sample due to lack of data 
   Quinn 14  FDI Stocks  -CIP 
  
parameter 
estimate  t-stat p-value 
parameter 
estimate  t-stat p-value 
parameter 
estimate  t-stat p-value 
∆Icap-1  0.584 3.844 0.000 0.008 0.211 0.833 -1.102  -3.538 0.001 
GR-1  0.027 0.479 0.633 0.052 0.845 0.399 -0.105  -1.194 0.236 
INFL-1  -0.092 -1.858 0.065 -0.081 -1.488 0.139 -0.337 -3.182 0.002 
∆OPEN-1  14.054 4.264  0.000 13.974 4.035  0.000 10.896 2.156  0.034 
∆PART-1  0.449 1.712 0.089 0.499 1.794 0.075 0.556 1.534 0.129 
LEFT  -1.150 -3.223 0.002 -1.204 -3.228 0.002 -1.389 -3.821 0.000 
∆UN-1  -0.759 -8.014 0.000 -0.744 -7.062 0.000 -1.063 -6.447 0.000 
MAAS-1  1.518 6.169 0.000 1.282 4.676 0.000 1.283 3.376 0.001 
No. Obs  158  158  96 
DW 1834.000  1.821  2.034 
R2 0.208 0.200 0.266 





Table   0-36: Robustness of the parameter estimates of the capital mobility index in the corporate tax revenues to total 
tax revenues regression to including total tax revenues in percent of GDP (controlling for the trend of taxes to grow 
other the sample period)  
   Quinn 14  FDI Stocks  -CIP 
  
parameter 
estimate  t-stat p-value 
parameter 
estimate  t-stat p-value 
parameter 
estimate  t-stat p-value 
∆Icap-1  0.146 3.374 0.001 -0.014 -1.480 0.140 -0.235 -2.957 0.004 
∆GR-1  0.031 2.875 0.004 0.032 3.066 0.002 0.031 1.676 0.097 
∆INFL-1  0.000 -0.008 0.994 0.004 0.323 0.747 -0.064  -1.929 0.056 
∆OPEN-1  -0.005 -1.394 0.165 -0.005 -1.229 0.221 -0.022 -2.996 0.003 
∆PART-1  -0.044 -1.190 0.235 -0.043 -1.146 0.253 -0.017 -0.312 0.756 
LEFT-1  -0.287 -3.944 0.000 -0.280 -3.802 0.000 -0.261 -2.670 0.009 
∆UN-1  -0.175 -6.718 0.000 -0.173 -6.470 0.000 -0.060 -1.205 0.231 
MAAS-1  0.572  10.155  0.000 0.579 9.933 0.000 0.366 3.638 0.000 
∆TOTALTAX  0.089 5.477 0.000 0.090 5.569 0.000 0.055 1.957 0.053 
 
Table   0-37: Robustness of the parameter estimates of the capital mobility index in the implicit capital tax rate 
relative to the implicit labor tax rate regression to including total tax revenues in percent of GDP (controling for the 
trend of taxes to grow other the sample period)  
   Quinn 14  FDI Stocks  -CIP 
  
parameter 
estimate t-stat p-value 
parameter 
estimate t-stat p-value 
parameter 
estimate t-stat p-value 
∆Icap -1  0.016 2.016 0.045 0.004 2.452 0.015 -0.034  -3.273 0.001 
∆GR-1  -0.008 -3.572 0.001 -0.007 -3.437 0.001 -0.004 -1.401 0.164 
∆INFL-1  -0.011 -4.554 0.000 -0.010 -4.139 0.000  0.000  0.027  0.979 
∆OPEN-1  0.000 -0.386 0.700 0.000 -0.168 0.867 -0.002 -1.127 0.262 
∆PART-1  0.013 2.234 0.027 0.012 2.077 0.039 0.032 3.468 0.001 
∆LEFT-1  0.027 2.020 0.045 0.030 2.321 0.021 -0.035  -2.385 0.019 
∆UN-1  -0.095  -16.598  0.000 -0.095  -16.789  0.000 -0.057 -7.466 0.000 
MAAS-1  0.054 4.038 0.000 0.045 3.592 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.996 
∆TOTALTAX  0.036 13.907 0.000  0.037 15.202 0.000  0.028  7.488  0.000 





  Robustness Tests for Hypothesis 4 
Table   0-38: Robustness of the parameter estimates of the capital mobility index and the interaction of size and capital 
mobility in the corporate tax revenues to GDP regression of dropping countries from the sample 
Excluding 
country:  Quinn 14  Quinn 
14*SIZE  FDI Stocks  FDI 

























e  t-stat 
AT  0.03 1.64 0.00 1.98 -0.01  -1.94 0.00 1.45  -0.136  -2.35  0.004  0.90 
BE  0.04 1.57 0.00 1.65 -0.01  -2.09 0.00 1.45  -0.219  -3.49  0.010  1.96 
DE  0.00 0.18 0.01 2.90 -0.01  -2.11 0.00 1.80  -0.125  -2.25  0.004  0.76 
DK  0.03 1.56 0.00 2.04 -0.01  -2.04 0.00 1.56  -0.087  -1.41  0.001  0.20 
FI  0.02 0.74 0.00 2.18 -0.02  -2.93 0.00 2.18  -0.138  -2.47  0.005  0.99 
FR  0.03 1.35 0.00 0.90 -0.01  -2.37 0.00 2.13  -0.109  -1.73  -0.002  -0.22 
GR  0.05 2.20 0.00 1.12 -0.01  -2.43 0.00 1.49  -0.138  -2.47  0.005  0.99 
IE  0.03 1.27 0.00 2.41 -0.02  -2.95 0.00 1.69  -0.126  -2.16  0.004  0.84 
IT  0.03 1.55 0.00 2.08 -0.01  -2.51 0.00 1.42  -0.181  -3.16  0.008  1.24 
NL  0.03 1.55 0.00 1.87 -0.01  -0.70 0.00 1.70  -0.135  -2.40  0.004  0.81 
SE  0.02 1.16 0.00 1.82 -0.01  -1.83 0.00 1.92  -0.087  -1.34  0.003  0.57 
UK  0.05 2.27 0.00 -0.74 0.00 0.01 0.00 -2.52  -0.187  -3.32  0.012  2.51 
ES  0.03 1.10 0.00 1.43 -0.01  -1.53 0.00 1.40  -0.163  -2.78  0.005  1.07 
PT  0.05 2.64 0.00 1.54 -0.02  -2.86 0.00 2.01  -0.146  -2.37  0.005  1.05 
 
Table   0-39: Robustness of the parameter estimates of the capital mobility index and the interaction of size and capital 
mobility in the implicit capital tax rate regression of dropping countries from the sample 
Excluding 
country:  Quinn 14  Quinn 14*SIZE  FDI Stocks  FDI 

























e  t-stat 
AT  -0.63  -1.98 0.08 2.85 0.26 2.37 -0.03  -2.95  -1.321  -1.54  -0.021  -0.33 
BE  -0.77  -1.87 0.11 3.82 0.13 1.12 -0.02  -1.46  -1.495  -1.73  -0.016  -0.25 
DE  -1.04  -3.12 0.15 4.91 0.05 0.45 0.00 0.29 -1.664  -1.71 0.010  0.14 
DK  -0.04  -0.13 0.07 2.79 0.22 1.95 -0.03  -2.62  -0.538  -0.66  -0.060  -0.96 
FI  -0.94  -3.42 0.09 3.70 0.06 0.56 -0.02  -1.32  -1.538  -1.88  -0.009  -0.14 
FR  -0.80  -2.26 0.13 4.31 0.15 1.25 -0.02  -0.83  -1.647  -1.71  -0.051  -0.62 
GR  -0.49  -1.47 0.08 3.32 0.23 2.08 -0.03  -2.63  -1.538  -1.88  -0.009  -0.14 
IE  -0.98  -2.75 0.10 3.69 0.10 0.85 -0.02  -1.53  -1.272  -1.43  -0.017  -0.26 
IT  -0.62  -1.96 0.07 2.56 0.23 2.00 -0.03  -2.10  -1.817  -2.06 0.027  0.38 
NL  -0.68  -2.13 0.09 3.38 0.13 0.83 -0.03  -2.57  -1.219  -1.39  -0.025  -0.38 
SE  -0.64  -1.93 0.10 3.96 0.19 1.69 -0.02  -1.87  -1.848  -1.82 0.028  0.39 
UK  -0.32  -1.07 0.01 0.29 0.29 2.78 -0.05  -7.00  -1.469  -1.70 0.020  0.32 
ES  -0.84  -2.40 0.11 4.10 0.18 1.59 -0.02  -1.67  -1.688  -1.88  -0.001  -0.02 
PT  -0.18  -0.47 0.08 3.15 0.20 1.73 -0.02  -2.02  -1.723  -1.63 0.008  0.10 





Table   0-40: Robustness of the parameter estimates of the capital mobility index and country size in the corporate tax 
revenues to GDP regression to including interest rates and election year dummies in as regressors 
   Quinn 14  FDI Stocks  -CIP 
  
parameter 
estimate t-stat p-value 
parameter 
estimate t-stat p-value 
parameter 
estimate t-stat p-value 
∆icap-1  0.030 1.400 0.163 -0.014 -2.270 0.024 -0.196 -3.189 0.002 
∆(Icap*SIZE)-1  0.002 1.520 0.130 0.001 1.686 0.093 0.006 1.338 0.184 
GR-1  0.023 2.858 0.005 0.024 3.053 0.003 0.025 1.878 0.063 
INFL-1  0.007 1.976 0.049 0.008 2.338 0.020 0.009 0.942 0.349 
∆OPEN-1  -0.004 -2.929 0.004 -0.003 -2.890 0.004 -0.016 -4.497 0.000 
∆PART-1  -0.001 -0.037 0.970 -0.003 -0.160 0.873 -0.020 -0.752 0.454 
LEFT  -0.112 -3.153 0.002 -0.109 -3.120 0.002 -0.136 -3.229 0.002 
∆UN-1  -0.046 -3.141 0.002 -0.044 -3.095 0.002 -0.027 -1.001 0.319 
MAAS-1  0.255 7.804 0.000 0.271 8.537 0.000 0.148 2.623 0.010 
∆IR-1  -0.007 -1.137 0.257 -0.006 -0.976 0.330 -0.026 -1.908 0.059 
ELEC+1  0.031 1.204 0.230 0.027 1.045 0.297 0.015 0.380 0.704 
ELEC  0.037 1.456 0.147 0.036 1.419 0.158 -0.027  -0.718 0.474 
 
Table   0-41: Robustness of the parameter estimates of the capital mobility index and country size in the implicit tax 
rate on capital regression to including interest rates and election year dummies in as regressors 
   Quinn 14  FDI Stocks  -CIP 
  
parameter 
estimate t-stat p-value 
parameter 
estimate t-stat p-value 
parameter 
estimate t-stat p-value 
∆icap-1  -0.902  -2.865 0.005 0.161 1.619 0.107 -0.900  -0.922 0.359 
∆(Icap*SIZE)-1  0.110 4.204 0.000 -0.021 -1.978 0.050 -0.037 -0.585 0.560 
GR-1  -0.044 -0.295 0.768 -0.103 -0.650 0.516  0.113  0.599  0.550 
INFL-1  -0.128 -2.176 0.031 -0.108 -1.684 0.094 -0.055 -0.515 0.608 
∆OPEN-1  0.0412  1.305 0.194 0.036 1.064 0.289 -0.094  -1.317 0.191 
∆PART-1  0.9785  2.916 0.004 1.444 4.518 0.000 1.034 2.485 0.015 
LEFT  0.4353  0.832 0.406 0.053 0.112 0.911 -0.470  -1.015 0.313 
∆UN-1  -2.003 -7.359 0.000 -2.000 -7.379 0.000 -1.429 -4.137 0.000 
MAAS-1  0.9509  1.994 0.048 1.100 2.209 0.028 0.746 1.091 0.278 
∆IR-1  0.3738  3.217 0.002 0.338 2.834 0.005 0.299 1.667 0.098 
ELEC+1  0.6259  1.706 0.090 0.422 1.132 0.259 0.928 2.125 0.036 
ELEC  -0.601 -1.657 0.099 -1.055 -2.906 0.004 -1.420 -3.431 0.001 





Table   0-42: Robustness of the parameter estimates of the capital mobility index and country size in the corporate tax 
revenues to GDP regression to including growth and inflation in first differences 
   Quinn 14  FDI Stocks  -CIP 
  
parameter 
estimate t-stat p-value 
parameter 
estimate t-stat p-value 
parameter 
estimate t-stat p-value 
∆Icap-1  0.031 1.628 0.105 -0.011 -1.865 0.064 -0.154 -2.761 0.007 
∆(Icap*SIZE)-1  0.003 2.455 0.015 0.001 1.089 0.277 0.005 1.104 0.272 
∆GRFD-1  0.003 0.612 0.541 0.002 0.501 0.617 0.005 0.567 0.572 
∆INFLFD-1  0.000 -0.010 0.992 0.002 0.364 0.717 -0.030 -2.156 0.033 
∆OPEN-1  -0.003 -2.393 0.018 -0.003 -2.362 0.019 -0.015 -4.378 0.000 
∆PART-1  0.007 0.424 0.672 0.009 0.573 0.567 0.002 0.090 0.929 
LEFT  -0.102 -3.288 0.001 -0.098 -3.010 0.003 -0.147 -3.748 0.000 
∆UN-1  -0.063 -5.731 0.000 -0.062 -5.758 0.000 -0.052 -2.574 0.011 
MAAS-1  0.233 8.381 0.000 0.242 8.164 0.000 0.172 3.828 0.000 
 
Table   0-43: Robustness of the parameter estimates of the capital mobility index and country size in the implicit 
capital tax rate regression to including growth and inflation in first differences 
   Quinn 14  FDI Stocks  -CIP 
  
parameter 
estimate t-stat p-value 
parameter 
estimate t-stat p-value 
parameter 
estimate t-stat p-value 
∆Icap-1  -0.225  -0.703 0.483 0.254 2.396 0.018 -1.957  -2.089 0.039 
∆(Icap*SIZE)-1  0.068 2.544 0.012 -0.022  -1.937 0.054 0.008 0.122 0.903 
∆GRFD-1  -0.435 -4.927 0.000 -0.441 -5.295 0.000 -0.322 -3.064 0.003 
∆INFLFD-1  -0.082 -0.780 0.437 -0.109 -1.076 0.283 -0.420 -2.447 0.016 
∆OPEN-1  0.028 1.141 0.256 0.026 1.109 0.269 -0.134  -2.386 0.019 
∆PART-1  0.867 2.728 0.007 1.203 4.239 0.000 1.405 3.691 0.000 
LEFT  0.337 0.618 0.537 0.063 0.127 0.899 -0.953  -1.733 0.086 
∆UN-1  -2.487 -12.021 0.000  -2.482 -12.439 0.000  -2.216  -7.891  0.000 
MAAS-1  1.072 2.822 0.005 1.066 2.944 0.004 0.562 1.072 0.286 




  Robustness Tests for Hypothesis 5 
 
Table   0-44: Robustness of the parameter estimates of the capital mobility index and the interaction of agglomeration 
and capital mobility in the implicit capital tax rate regression of dropping countries from the sample 
Excluding 
country: 
Quinn 14  Quinn 































AT  -1.61  -3.27 0.08 3.17 -0.03  -0.10 0.01 0.40 0.30 0.19 -0.09  -1.07 
BE  -1.74  -3.34 0.10 3.64 -0.09  -0.25 0.01 0.38 0.40 0.25 -0.10  -1.20 
DE  -1.42 -1.55 0.07  1.67 -0.01 -0.02 0.00  0.22 -0.01 -0.01 -0.07 -0.82 
DK  -2.39 -5.13 0.15  6.71 -0.19 -0.55 0.01  0.76 -1.93 -1.20 0.04  0.48 
FI  -1.24  -3.26 0.05 2.42 0.01 0.05 0.00 -0.12  -0.07  -0.05  -0.07  -0.92 
FR  -1.96  -3.84 0.09 3.69 -0.03  -0.09 0.01 0.39 0.57 0.33 -0.14  -1.47 
GR  -1.90 -3.60 0.10  4.01 -0.36 -1.03 0.02  1.25 -0.07 -0.05 -0.07 -0.92 
IE  -2.57 -4.84 0.11  4.55 -0.14 -0.40 0.01  0.41 -0.36 -0.23 -0.06 -0.69 
IT  -1.86  -3.77 0.09 3.42 0.28 0.78 -0.01  -0.49 1.45 0.76 -0.12  -1.33 
NL  -1.98  -4.21 0.10 4.21 -0.49  -1.30 0.02 1.15 0.23 0.15 -0.08  -0.99 
SE  -1.59  -3.10 0.08 3.23 0.04 0.11 0.00 0.13 0.57 0.34 -0.11  -1.21 
UK  -1.86  -4.11 0.08 3.66 0.03 0.08 0.00 0.08 0.59 0.39 -0.08  -1.07 
ES  -2.05  -3.70 0.09 3.47 0.16 0.44 0.00 -0.17  -0.68  -0.42  -0.05  -0.58 
PT  -1.24  -1.79 0.07 2.42 0.08 0.20 0.00 0.02 -0.59  -0.31  -0.05  -0.51 
 
Table   0-45: Robustness of the parameter estimates of the capital mobility index and agglomeration economies in the 
implicit tax rate on capital regression to including interest rates and election year dummies in as regressors 
   Quinn 14  FDI Stocks  -CIP 
  
parameter 
estimate t-stat p-value 
parameter 
estimate t-stat p-value 
parameter 
estimate t-stat p-value 
∆Icap-1  -1.711 -3.797 0.000 -0.038 -0.119 0.906 -0.339 -0.193 0.847 
∆(Icap*AGGLOM)-1  0.075 3.435 0.001 0.005 0.347 0.729 -0.046  -0.550 0.583 
GR-1  -0.138 -0.958 0.339 -0.116 -0.720 0.472  0.095  0.503  0.616 
INFL-1  -0.107 -1.652 0.100 -0.100 -1.568 0.119 -0.030 -0.265 0.792 
∆OPEN-1  0.037 1.090 0.277 0.032 0.940 0.348 -0.095  -1.330 0.187 
∆PART-1  1.470 4.910 0.000 1.377 4.101 0.000 0.980 2.327 0.022 
LEFT  0.047 0.101 0.920 0.134 0.282 0.778 -0.490  -1.000 0.320 
∆UN-1  -1.833 -6.891 0.000 -2.006 -7.358 0.000 -1.538 -4.622 0.000 
MAAS-1  0.814 1.681 0.095 0.927 1.864 0.064 0.807 1.125 0.263 
∆IR-1  0.373 3.093 0.002 0.358 3.018 0.003 0.266 1.424 0.157 
ELEC+1  0.562 1.574 0.117 0.613 1.678 0.095 0.860 1.933 0.056 
ELEC  -1.023 -2.834 0.005 -0.951 -2.619 0.010 -1.413 -3.306 0.001 





Table   0-46: Robustness of the parameter estimates of the capital mobility index and agglomeration economies in the 
implicit capital tax rate regression to including growth and inflation in first differences 
   Quinn 14  FDI Stocks  -CIP 
  
parameter 
estimate t-stat p-value 
parameter 
estimate t-stat p-value 
parameter 
estimate t-stat p-value 
∆Icap-1  -1.665 -3.205 0.002 -0.315 -0.975 0.331 -1.031 -0.639 0.524 
∆(Icap*AGGLOM)-1  0.095 4.039 0.000 0.019 1.417 0.158 -0.037  -0.448 0.655 
∆GRFD-1  -0.476 -5.607 0.000 -0.480 -5.722 0.000 -0.304 -2.960 0.004 
∆INFLFD-1  -0.099 -0.959 0.339 -0.130 -1.298 0.196 -0.381 -2.152 0.034 
∆OPEN-1  0.024 0.965 0.336 0.029 1.239 0.217 -0.134  -2.346 0.021 
∆PART-1  1.348 4.765 0.000 1.203 4.100 0.000 1.343 3.551 0.001 
LEFT  -0.067 -0.131 0.896 -0.019 -0.038 0.970 -1.023 -1.819 0.072 
∆UN-1  -2.181  -10.225  0.000 -2.390  -11.272  0.000 -2.206 -7.887 0.000 
MAAS-1  0.946 2.675 0.008 0.820 2.283 0.024 0.560 1.018 0.311 
 